Age 15 · Semester 3 — Texts and interpretation
Four lessons for this semester. When you are ready, take the test for this semester.
Lesson 1: The writings of Thomas Aquinas on natural law: history and contents
Thomas Aquinas wrote an enormous amount in a short life, and his writings on natural law occupy a small but famous corner of a vast work. The Summa Theologiae, begun in the 1260s and left unfinished at his death in 1274, was designed as a textbook for theology students, organised in questions and articles. Each article states objections, gives a contrary authority, presents Aquinas's own answer, and then replies to the objections one by one. The Treatise on Law sits in the second part of the Summa, questions 90 to 108, and the core discussion of natural law is concentrated in question 94, which generations of students have read, translated, and argued about ever since.
The contents reward slow reading. Question 90 defines law in general. Question 91 distinguishes the four kinds of law: eternal, natural, human, and divine. Question 94 asks whether natural law is a habit, what its precepts are, whether it is the same for all people, and whether it can change or be erased from the human heart. Aquinas answers that the first principle, do good and avoid evil, can never be erased, while secondary conclusions can be obscured in particular peoples by bad customs or false reasoning. He gives the famous example that theft was reportedly not counted wrong among some peoples, which he treats as a corruption of judgement, not proof that no standard exists.
Aquinas's other writings fill out the picture. His commentaries on Aristotle's Ethics and Politics show where he learned to reason about virtue, friendship, and the city. His early work and his disputed questions return to conscience and synderesis, the natural habit by which humans grasp first moral principles. Students should also know what Aquinas did not write: he never produced a separate book called On Natural Law, and his teaching must be gathered from these larger works, in Latin, which is why translations and guides differ in emphasis. Knowing the history of the text protects readers from treating a single quoted sentence as the whole of his thought.
How the writings were received is part of their history too. Aquinas was controversial in his lifetime, and some of his propositions were condemned at Paris and Oxford shortly after his death, yet his order, the Dominicans, promoted his work, and the Catholic Church later canonised him and named him a Doctor of the Church. In the twentieth century, Pope Leo XIII's encouragement of Thomism made the Summa central to Catholic education, while the Second Vatican Council and later debates broadened discussion. Secular philosophers also returned to question 94 during the post-war revival of natural law, reading Aquinas alongside Grotius and Locke as part of one long conversation about law and morality.
Reading Aquinas today, students meet both a medieval monk and a permanent discussion partner. His world assumed things many modern readers question, including a created order directed by God, yet his method, define terms, hear objections fairly, distinguish cases, answer precisely, remains a model of honest reasoning. A guided approach works best: read question 94 slowly, note each distinction, test his examples against your own experience, and compare his conclusions with other thinkers in this course. The aim is not to memorise a verdict but to understand how one of history's most careful minds built the natural law argument, so that agreement or disagreement afterwards is genuinely informed.
Lesson 2: Cicero's On the Laws: history and contents
Marcus Tullius Cicero, Rome's most famous orator, wrote On the Laws, in Latin De Legibus, near the end of his life in the 50s and 40s BCE. The work is a dialogue, modelled on Plato, in which Cicero talks with his brother Quintus and his friend Atticus while walking on his family estate. Only three books survive, and the text breaks off unfinished, probably because Cicero's violent death in 43 BCE, when he was executed in a political purge, ended his writing. Even incomplete, the dialogue became one of the main channels through which Greek Stoic ideas about natural law flowed into Roman law, medieval thought, and modern political writing.
Book One contains the philosophy. Cicero argues that law is not invented by human cleverness but rooted in nature: the highest reason, implanted in all humans, commands what is right and forbids the opposite. Because reason is shared, law is shared, and all who share it form one community under the gods, whether they live in Rome or Athens. From this he draws a striking conclusion: unjust enactments, such as the decrees of tyrants, do not deserve the name of law. He gives the example of a law granting dictatorial power to a cruel ruler and insists that calling it law confuses words, since law by its nature aims at justice and the safety of citizens.
Books Two and Three turn from philosophy to proposals. Book Two drafts religious laws for an ideal Roman state, covering temples, priests, festivals, and oaths, and shows Cicero trying to preserve Roman tradition while giving it rational foundations. Book Three discusses magistrates, the officials who hold power, their duties, and the checks upon them, including the senate and the people's assemblies. Modern readers sometimes skip these books as dated, but they teach an important lesson: Cicero believed natural law should shape actual institutions, not float above them. His proposals mix universal principles with very Roman arrangements, and judging where principle ends and local custom begins is itself an exercise in natural law reasoning.
The history of the text is fragile and fascinating. Unlike Cicero's speeches, On the Laws survived through a small number of medieval manuscripts, copied by monks who valued Cicero's Latin style as much as his philosophy. Renaissance humanists printed and studied it, lawyers quoted its definition of law, and Aquinas, who knew Cicero's related work On the Republic through other writers, worked within the tradition it created. John Locke and the American founders read Cicero in school; his sentence that we are born for justice, and that right is based not on opinion but on nature, echoes through later declarations. A text that nearly vanished became a foundation stone of Western legal thought.
Reading On the Laws today, students should watch Cicero's method as well as his conclusions. He argues from nature, tests definitions against hard examples, and lets his brother raise objections that force clearer answers. He also writes as a statesman who had seen his republic collapse into civil war, which gives his defence of law urgency rather than abstraction. The guided task is to separate three layers: the Stoic philosophy he inherited, the Roman institutions he defended, and the universal claims he made about justice. Where those layers support each other, and where they strain, is exactly where thoughtful readers, ancient and modern, have found the dialogue most alive.
Lesson 3: How texts are interpreted
Every text in this course, from Cicero to the Universal Declaration, must be interpreted, and interpretation is a skill with rules of its own. A text does not apply itself. Readers must decide what its words meant, what its author intended, how its parts fit together, and what it requires in situations the author never imagined. Natural law traditions have always known this, because their central texts are old, translated, and sometimes in tension with each other. Aquinas harmonised Aristotle, Roman law, and scripture; modern judges harmonise constitutions with new technologies. The honest student learns the main methods of interpretation and the dangers each method is meant to prevent.
The first method is historical and linguistic: establish what the words meant in their original language and setting. Cicero's Latin ius can mean law, right, or justice, and choosing among them changes an argument. Aquinas's Latin must be read with medieval, not modern, assumptions. Translations should be compared when a claim turns on one word, and scholars check manuscripts because copyists made errors. The second method is contextual: read a passage inside its whole work and its author's other writings. Aquinas's sharp sentence about unjust laws reads differently beside his cautions about disorder, and quoting either half alone misleads. Context is the interpreter's main defence against proof-texting, the practice of lifting lines to win arguments the author would not recognise.
A third set of questions concerns authority and purpose. Religious readers may ask how a text relates to revelation and to the teaching authority of their community. Legal readers ask whether a text is binding law, persuasive wisdom, or historical evidence, and courts follow formal rules about precedent and constitutional purpose. Philosophical readers test a text's arguments for validity regardless of its authority: a true claim by Cicero is true because the reasoning holds, not because Cicero is famous. Natural law interpretation often blends all three, which is why debates can be confusing until each side states which question it is answering. Naming the question, historical, legal, or philosophical, resolves many apparent disagreements before they harden.
Interpretation also faces the problem of change. Aquinas could not discuss aeroplanes, the internet, or modern medicine, yet his principles are applied to all three. Responsible application works by analogy: identify the principle, examine how the new case resembles and differs from the cases the principle was formed on, and argue openly about the fit. Irresponsible application simply declares that the old text settles the new case, or, at the opposite extreme, that age makes a text useless. Between those extremes lies the living tradition: communities that keep old texts authoritative by arguing carefully, in public, about what fidelity to them requires now. Courts, churches, universities, and parliaments are all, in part, institutions for doing this work.
For students, practical habits follow. Read the whole passage, not the quotation. Check who wrote it, when, and for whom. Distinguish what the text says from what later tradition says it says, and both from what you wish it said. When two good readings conflict, prefer the one that explains more of the text with less strain, and say openly where uncertainty remains. Interpretation done this way is not a trick for escaping texts but a discipline for hearing them accurately, including when they challenge the reader. That discipline matters far beyond this course, in law, religion, journalism, and every argument where someone claims a document is on their side.
Lesson 4: The Universal Declaration of Human Rights and other writings
The Universal Declaration of Human Rights is the most famous modern writing in the natural law family, even though its drafters carefully avoided settling philosophical arguments. Adopted by the United Nations General Assembly in Paris on 10 December 1948, it proclaims thirty articles: civil and political rights such as life, liberty, fair trial, free expression, and freedom of religion, and economic and social rights such as work, rest, education, and an adequate standard of living. Its preamble grounds everything in the inherent dignity and the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family, language that echoes Cicero and Aquinas in modern, diplomatic form.
The drafting history shows deliberate common ground. A committee chaired by Eleanor Roosevelt included thinkers from different traditions: Peng Chun Chang, a Chinese philosopher who brought Confucian ideas into discussion; Charles Malik, a Lebanese philosopher who pressed questions about the person and community; and Rene Cassin of France, who shaped the text's structure. The drafters asked what rights every tradition could affirm, even when their reasons differed. A famous consultation by UNESCO collected views from religious and secular thinkers worldwide. The result was not a treaty and created no court, yet it became the standard against which later treaties, constitutions, and campaigns measure themselves, translated into hundreds of languages.
Other writings belong on the same shelf. The French Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1789 announced that men are born and remain free and equal in rights, and it shaped European politics for two centuries. The American Bill of Rights of 1791 turned rights into enforceable limits on a government. In the twentieth century, regional charters followed: the European Convention on Human Rights, the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights, which notably includes peoples' rights and duties alongside individual rights, and the American Convention on Human Rights. Reading them together shows one idea in many legal cultures: written lists trying to protect unwritten dignity.
Religious and philosophical writings complete the library. Papal letters such as Pacem in Terris of 1963 set out a Catholic catalogue of rights and duties grounded in natural law. Martin Luther King Jr.'s Letter from Birmingham Jail of the same year argued from natural law to American Christians and became a classic of moral persuasion. Thinkers such as Jacques Maritain, a Catholic philosopher who advised the UNESCO consultation, argued that people who disagree about ultimate reasons can still agree on practical rights, a thesis sometimes called an overlapping consensus. Critics of the whole library ask whether lists of rights keep growing beyond what reason can support, and whether economic rights belong beside liberty rights; those debates are part of studying the writings, not distractions from them.
For students, the way to read these documents is comparatively and critically. Notice what each list includes and omits, which rights it makes enforceable, and what it says about duties and community as well as freedoms. Notice too the gap between proclamation and practice: every state that voted for the Declaration in 1948 fell short of it somewhere, and many still do. Natural law readers treat that gap not as proof the writings are worthless but as the reason they exist: a standard above practice by which practice is judged and reformed. Keeping both the achievement and the gap in view is the mature way to honour these texts, neither worshipping the paper nor dismissing it.