Adult Year 2 · Semester 4 — Places, arts, and the road ahead
Four lessons for this semester. When you are ready, take the test for this semester.
Lesson 1: The library and the academy and the courtroom
The final semester turns to the doctrine's places, and it begins with the three rooms in which natural law has always actually lived: the library, where its texts are kept; the academy, where its argument is taught; and the courtroom, where its standard is applied — a triad the student should compare, as he enters, with the other rooms of this building, whose places are temples, mosques, and shrines. This doctrine's sacred geography is a geography of paper and speech, and its three places are best understood as one institution in three moods: the keeping, the questioning, and the deciding of the law above laws. The library first. The doctrine's memory is a shelf: Cicero beside Aquinas, the canonists' glosses beside Grotius, the Declaration in its five hundred languages beside the travaux that explain it — and the library's history is the doctrine's survival told in furniture, the monasteries' chained books carrying the Roman through the empire's fall, the universities' stationers renting the Summa by the quire to the students, the law reports binding the courts' memory into the only scripture the common law acknowledges. The modern library has dissolved into the network — the whole canon free, searchable, and unguarded, as Year One noted — and the school's student should mark both the gain and the loss in the doctrine's own terms: the standard has never been more available, and the library's old function, the curation that told the reader which books were the canon, has never been weaker, so that the modern reader must do for himself what the chained shelf once did — decide what the doctrine is, from the whole roaring archive, which is the academy's task arriving early.
The academy — the university and its ancestors, the porch, the lyceum, the medieval studium, the law school — is the second place, and its defining act is the disputation: knowledge advanced by staged objection, in public, under rules. The lesson gives the academy's history as the doctrine's biography in architecture: the schools of Athens in their groves and painted porches, philosophy as a walk and a conversation; the Roman law schools of Berytus and Constantinople, where the empire's jurists were formed on the Institutes; the medieval universities, corporations of masters and students chartered by pope and emperor, in which the quaestio was the day's liturgy and the Summa its product; the law schools of the modern world, where the case method keeps the disputation's form in the vernacular of the reports. The school's point about the academy is the one the whole course implies: the doctrine does not merely happen to be taught in such places; it is the kind of thing that exists only in such places — a standard whose whole mode of being is to be argued — so that the academy's health, its freedom to stage the objections at full strength, is not the doctrine's luxury but its life-support, and the ages in which the academy was closed, conscripted, or burned are, in the history semester's record, exactly the ages in which the doctrine's standard went silent and its emergencies went unanswered.
The courtroom is the third place and the triad's point of decision, and the lesson gives it the depth its daily importance earns. The courtroom is where the law above laws stops being a philosophy: the advocate citing the dignity clause against the statute, the judge reading the enactment against the constitution's standard and finding it wanting, the tribunal at Nuremberg reaching past the defendants' law to the law they were held to know as men — every such moment is the doctrine at work in its working clothes, and the courtroom's furniture preaches it: the bench raised, that judgment be public and above the crowd; the parties standing equal before it, the dignity premise in floor plan; the reasons given aloud and recorded, that the judgment be answerable to the standard it invokes, in the next court and in the republic of readers. The tradition's judges have known the room's theology for as long as there have been rooms: Deuteronomy's charge hangs, in words or in substance, in the conscience of every court the doctrine has formed, and the courtroom's corruption — the bribed bench, the foreordained verdict, the secret proceeding — is therefore not merely a political failure in this teaching but a desecration, the standard's own house turned against the standard. The school's student, who will sit in such rooms as litigant, juror, advocate, or accused, is meant to leave the lesson able to see the room: a machine for giving each his due, in public, by reasons — or its counterfeit, which the doctrine exists to name.
The lesson's last word sets the three places in their circuit, which is the doctrine's circulatory system entire. The library keeps what the academy questions; the academy forms who the courtroom trusts; the courtroom's decisions return to the library as the cases by which the next academy argues — text, question, decision, text — the loop by which a standard without a church maintains itself across the centuries, each room correcting the others' characteristic disease: the library's dust by the academy's doubt, the academy's theater by the courtroom's stakes, the courtroom's power by the library's memory. The school's student has spent the year inside the loop — reading the texts, staging the objections, and judging the cases in the lessons' own small court — and the final places of the course now take him out of the rooms altogether: to the quiet place in nature where the doctrine's name was born, and to a hall in Philadelphia where, one summer, the loop produced a sentence that changed the world's address.
Lesson 2: A quiet place in nature and Independence Hall in Philadelphia
The second places lesson joins the doctrine's two unlikeliest shrines: a quiet place in nature — any place, and therefore the lesson's subject is a kind of place rather than an address — and Independence Hall in Philadelphia, the one building on earth where the doctrine's sentence was enacted into a nation's birth. The quiet place first, and the lesson must explain why a school of law keeps a meadow in its geography. The doctrine is named for nature, and its teachers have always repaired to nature as to a first text: the Stoics walking the porch between the city's noise and the garden's order; Cicero staging his dialogues in the groves of Arpinum and Tusculum, where the argument breathes; the medieval schools' gardens; Rousseau's walks and Kant's — the Königsberg philosopher's daily constitutional, by which the neighbors set their clocks, being the Enlightenment's version of the peripatetic office; Thoreau's pond, where an American of the doctrine's own century went to read the moral law in the ice and the woodchuck. The practice is not decoration: the tradition holds that the order the doctrine trusts is most legible where it is least disturbed — that a mind which has watched the seasons keep their covenant, the light return on its day, the acorn keep its appointment with the oak, has received the cosmology's first lesson in the only form that cannot be argued with, and that the quiet place is therefore the doctrine's chapel in the strictest sense available to it: the place where its premise is not stated but seen.
The quiet place has its discipline, and the lesson gives it, because this school gives every place its practice. The discipline is attention, and its rules are the ones the naturalists and the moralists share: to go out regularly, as one goes to a teacher; to learn the names — of the trees, the birds, the stars — the tradition holding, with Linnaeus and with the Psalmist in their different idioms, that naming is the beginning of knowing, and knowing of the reverence that the doctrine calls the recognition of order; to keep the record, the journal and the phenology, the dates of the first frog and the last leaf, by which a lifetime's attention becomes a knowledge no book can give, of one place's fidelity to the whole's law. And the discipline has its ethics, which the doctrine draws as directly as any in the course: the quiet place teaches the student's standing in the order — a part, not the proprietor — from which the tradition's environmental teaching, in its modern form, derives the stewardship the encyclicals and the philosophers argue: the world as a common home held in trust, nature's goods destined for all and for the unborn, the quiet place's lesson generalized into a law for the species that alone can read it. The school is careful, here as everywhere, to give the doctrine's own account and no other's: the meadow is not worshiped, in this tradition; it is read — and the reading is the worship of a rational animal, the only kind it has.
Independence Hall is the quiet place's opposite and completion: a room where nature's law was read aloud and acted on, in a city, at a desk, in a summer. The building — the Pennsylvania State House, raised in the 1730s and 40s in a plain Georgian brick that the lesson notes because the plainness is the point: the doctrine's greatest political moment occurred not in a palace or a temple but in a provincial assembly room with Windsor chairs — held the Second Continental Congress through the war, received the Declaration in its Assembly Room on July 4, 1776, and eleven years later held the Constitutional Convention that built the doctrine's sentence a house of law: the same room, the same chairs by tradition, Washington presiding in the rising-sun chair at which Franklin, at the signing, made the room's most famous remark — that he had watched the carved sun through the Convention's doubts, wondering whether it was rising or setting, and now had the happiness to know it was a rising and not a setting sun. The hall's later career is the doctrine's American biography in architecture: the Liberty Bell, cracked and silent in its pavilion across the chestnut street, rung no more and visited the more for it; the hall preserved, restored, and inscribed among the world's heritage as the shrine of a proposition — the only building on the heritage list, the school observes, whose sanctity attaches not to its beauty, its antiquity, or its god, but to a sentence about the rights of man, drafted upstairs in a lodging house and adopted in its room.
The lesson's last word sets the two places facing each other, as the course's geography now requires. The quiet place is where the doctrine's premise is seen; the hall is where it was said — and the tradition's whole life runs between the seeing and the saying, the order contemplated in the meadow becoming the sentence enacted in the room, the sentence requiring, for its renewal in each generation, the return to the meadow's school of attention. The school's student, who has no pilgrimage to make in this subject — no tomb, no relic, no holy city — is given instead the doctrine's two portable pilgrimages, which he can perform in any country on earth: to go out into a quiet place and attend, until the order is not a proposition but a perception; and to stand in whatever room his own nation's sentences were adopted in, and read them against the standard they profess. The arts in which this doctrine's imagination has dressed itself — sparer than the other rooms', and stranger — are the next lesson's survey.
Lesson 3: Art, music, and literature of Natural Law
The third lesson of the final semester surveys the doctrine's imagination — its art, music, and literature — a survey that must begin with the paradox the student is now prepared to appreciate from the opposite side: a doctrine of reason, without revelation, ritual, or a god of its own to depict, has nevertheless generated one of the world's great bodies of imaginative work, and the survey's plot is how an idea becomes images. The visual arts first. The doctrine's characteristic image is not a person but a personification: Justice herself, the blindfolded woman with the scales and the sword, who descends from the Roman Justitia through the medieval virtues to the courthouse pediments of the whole world — the blindfold, a Renaissance addition, signifying the impartiality the doctrine demands, the scales the weighing of the due, the sword the standard's enforcement, the whole figure being natural law's answer to the icon: an abstraction given a face because the human imagination will have one, and a face deliberately veiled because the doctrine's justice must not see the persons it weighs. Around her stand the tradition's other images: the social contract's frontispieces — Hobbes's Leviathan, the giant composed of his subjects, the most famous political image ever engraved, preaching the rival doctrine in the tradition's own visual language; the American iconography of 1776, the eye of Providence over the unfinished pyramid on the great seal and the dollar, the doctrine's cosmology minted; and the monuments of the rights — the Statue of Liberty, a Roman goddess in copper carrying a tablet inscribed with a date in Roman numerals, the doctrine's sentence become a harbor light.
The music, second, is the doctrine's thinnest art and the lesson says so honestly, because a philosophy has themes but not a liturgy, and its music is borrowed and occasional — which makes its few native works the more telling. The tradition's anthem is the Ode to Joy: Schiller's poem of universal brotherhood — all men become brothers where thy gentle wing abides — set by Beethoven at the Ninth Symphony's climax, in a setting whose first performers included the deaf composer beating time to applause he could not hear, and adopted in the twentieth century as the anthem of the Council of Europe and the European Union — the doctrine's nearest approach to a hymn, sung by a continent that could agree on the melody precisely because the words, like the Declaration's, state the conclusion on which the reasons may differ. Beside it stand the works the doctrine claims by adoption: Handel's and the oratorio tradition's settings of the moral law's majesty; the spirituals and the freedom songs, in which the enslaved and their descendants set the doctrine's own Exodus grammar — borrowed, as the Judaism course recorded, from an older people's book — to the melodies that carried a movement; and the protest song as a genre entire, the standard's casuistry in verse and chorus, from the broadside ballads of Locke's century to the anthems sung outside the prisons of the student's.
The literature, third and largest, is where the doctrine's imagination truly lives, because its native form is the argument and its masterpieces are the works in which the argument becomes a person. The survey's canon, in the order the course has met them: Antigone, the founding drama, and her sisters in the theater — the Antigones of Anouilh and Heaney, the Creons of every age's stage; Shakespeare, whose plays are the doctrine's great English casebook — the Merchant's courtroom, where the quality of mercy is preached against the bond's letter in the tradition's own terms; Lear on the heath, discovering the unaccommodated man; Richard II and the histories, where the divine right the doctrine opposes receives its most beautiful English voice and its refutation in the same tetralogy; the novel of conscience that descends from them — Hugo's Valjean and Javert, the doctrine's two poles incarnate, the convict who becomes mercy and the policeman who is destroyed by law without it, in the nineteenth century's greatest natural-law novel; Dostoevsky's Grand Inquisitor, the doctrine's darkest examination, in which the case against freedom is made by its most intelligent enemy; and the modern literature of the tribunal and the cell, written in the places where the standard costs the most. The school's student should note the canon's unity across its twenty-five centuries: every work in it stages the same scene — a person, a power, and a law above the power, appealed to in the person's voice — the doctrine's imagination being, in the end, that scene's endless and necessary rehearsal.
The lesson's last word weighs the arts by the school's measure, as the year's other surveys were weighed. The doctrine's imagination asks the artist for one thing the other rooms' arts are not asked for in the same way: that the work argue — that the scales be true scales, the courtroom a real court, the person's appeal a real appeal, judged by the audience as a case is judged. It forbids the imagination's favorite exemption, the claim that the work is only a story: in this tradition the story is evidence, Antigone a precedent, Valjean a case in the reports of the conscience. What it has made, under that discipline, is an art whose signature is the scene of appeal — the powerless person, standing, speaking the standard aloud — repeated from the Theban plain to the Birmingham cell with a fidelity no other idea in the building can match for sheer dramatic persistence. The student leaves the survey with the course's argument complete in his hands: natural law is a civilization built around a sentence — that there is a law above the laws — its art the sentence's illustration, its places the sentence's rooms, its ethics the sentence's casuistry, its calendar the sentence's anniversaries. The final lesson asks what the student, sentence in hand, does next.
Lesson 4: Continuing to learn about Natural Law
The final lesson of the Natural Law school is addressed, as the building's final lessons are, to the student himself: how to go on learning about a doctrine that is twenty-five centuries old, owns no congregation, and is at once the modern world's official philosophy and its least examined one. The school's first counsel is the one it gave at the door, now with the course's authority behind it: the doctrine is learned in its cases. The treatises are open — the Summa in free editions, Cicero in every library, the Declaration in five hundred languages — but the tradition's own pedagogy, from the confessional to the clinic, teaches that the standard is mastered where it is applied: in the tribunal records and the constitutional judgments, the dissidents' memoirs and the committees' reports, the hard cases of the student's own profession argued in the doctrine's distinctions. The graduate's shelf, given plainly: the Treatise on Law entire, read slowly, with the objections performed; On the Laws and the Antigone, the doctrine's Roman and Greek charters; Locke's Second Treatise with Filmer's ghost in the margin; the Declaration with its travaux and its struck-out clause; Finnis for the modern restatement and his critics for its audit; King's letter and Radbruch's five minutes of jurisprudence for the doctrine in the emergency's own hand. And beside the shelf, the course's standing discipline: keep the columns — the doctrine's account of itself, the record of its professors' practice, and the testimony of those who appealed to it at their cost — and let none of the three be mistaken for the whole.
The second counsel concerns the company, because this doctrine, alone in the building, must be studied in borrowed rooms, and the student should know the addresses. The law school's jurisprudence seminar and the philosophy society's evening; the reading group — this room's chavruta being any two readers with the text between them and the objections staged at full strength; the human-rights organization's training, where the standard is taught as a craft to its practitioners; the congregation's adult class and the university's extension course, where the doctrine is read by the citizens who will sit on the juries and the committees of the next emergency. The school adds the counsel of its own method, which the graduate is now equipped to apply without supervision: read the doctrine's enemies in the original and at their strongest — the positivists, the relativists, the communitarians, the realists of power — because a standard that is not regularly measured against its refutations becomes, in its keeper's hands, exactly what its enemies call it, a prejudice with footnotes. The tradition's confidence, which the student is invited to share on the evidence of twenty-five centuries, is that the doctrine survives its enemies' best arguments the way it has survived its friends' worst conduct: by being needed, in the next case, by the next person with dust on her hands and an edict against her.
The third counsel is about the student's own position, and the school speaks it carefully, because this doctrine's student graduates into a peculiar responsibility the other rooms' students do not share in the same form. The creeds' graduates are asked to believe and to practice; the natural lawyer is asked to judge — in the jury box and the bureau, on the committee and at the desk where the order arrives for signature — and to judge not by his preferences, which the doctrine does not consult, but by the standard he has studied, which it does. The school asks no orthodoxy of its graduate — it is a school, not a party, and it has taught the doctrine's critics with the same care as its doctors — but it does ask the discipline the whole course has practiced: state the act precisely, name the principles, weigh the circumstances, consult the honest, and then answer for the judgment, in the knowledge that the doctrine's honor roll consists largely of people who did exactly that and lost. Between the cynic, who knows the standard is a fiction and signs anyway, and the fanatic, who knows the standard's every application in advance and consults no one, stands the position this course has occupied and now hands over: the standard is real, its applications are argued, and the arguing — in the seminar, at the desk, and when necessary in the street — is the graduate's permanent office, from which there is no retirement this side of the grave.
The course's last word is the school's farewell to this room, and it borrows, as is fitting, no one's liturgy — for this doctrine has none — but the gesture of its own greatest scene. When Antigone is led away, the chorus does not save her, and the play does not pretend the standard triumphed in Thebes that year; what the standard did was survive — in the text, in the audience's memory, in the schoolrooms of the next twenty-five centuries — to be appealed to again. The student leaves the Natural Law school in that posture: the course complete, the argument not — the treatise still to be read against its critics, the case still to be judged at his own desk, the sentence still to be stated aloud in the room where it costs something. The school thanks the student for learning about natural law in the only spirit in which it can honestly be taught: with its texts open, its objections at full strength, and its standard — right reason in agreement with nature, the inherent dignity of every person, the law above the laws — described by its school, defended by its witnesses, and left, as its teachers have always left it, in the student's own hands.