Adult Year 2 · Semester 2 — Celebrations and community
Four lessons for this semester. When you are ready, take the test for this semester.
Lesson 1: Human Rights Day — December 10: history and observance
Human Rights Day, December 10, is the natural-law tradition's one universal feast: the anniversary of the Universal Declaration's adoption at Paris in 1948, proclaimed by the United Nations General Assembly in 1950 as a day for all peoples and all nations, and observed since by governments, schools, and the human-rights movement as the year's occasion for taking the standard's measure and one's own. The lesson gives its history first, in the proportion the day itself observes. The Declaration whose birthday it keeps was, as Year One's overview showed, a proclamation without an army — and the day was created in the same spirit, as an instrument of the only enforcement the standard has ever claimed for itself: publicity, education, and shame. The Assembly's resolution invited every member state to proclaim the Declaration's text in its schools and to mark the anniversary with what the resolution called the widest possible dissemination — the doctrine's feast being, characteristically, not a rite but a reading. The Nobel Peace Prize's traditional date, December 10 — Alfred Nobel's death-day, fixed long before the Declaration — gave the observance its accidental crown: the world's most famous honor for the standard's servants is conferred, by a coincidence the movement has never tired of noting, on the standard's own day, at Oslo, within sight of the fjord, as the northern winter's dark comes down at three in the afternoon.
The observance, as it is actually kept across the world, is the lesson's second subject, and the school gives it in its real variety rather than in a program. In the United Nations' own house, the Secretary-General issues the year's message and the High Commissioner for Human Rights names the year's theme — the themes of recent decades running from the Declaration's anniversaries to the rights of the young, the defenders, the displaced — and the organization's field offices mark the day with the local movements. In the schools of a hundred countries, December 10 is the human-rights curriculum's annual summit: the Declaration read aloud, article by article, in the students' own languages — the five hundred translations making the reading possible in nearly every classroom on earth — the essay contests and the poster exhibitions and the mock tribunals by which the standard is handed, deliberately, to the generation that will need it in its own emergency. In the unfree countries, the day is kept at the practice's usual price: the vigils outside the prisons, the statements smuggled to the foreign press, the empty chair at the Oslo ceremony of 2010, when the imprisoned Liu Xiaobo's Peace Prize was placed on a vacant seat before the world's cameras — the observance's most eloquent modern image, a feast kept by an absence, which the school records as the day's truest sermon on its subject.
The day's critics, given their turn as this school's method requires, speak from inside the movement as much as from outside it. The ritualization charge: that an annual day of messages and posters has become the standard's substitute rather than its instrument — the governments most fluent in the day's vocabulary being, in the record's dry annual finding, frequently the governments whose prisons the day exists to shame, the observance laundering the observance's violators in the standard's own language. The selectivity charge: that the day's attention, and the movement's, falls where the cameras point, and that the unphotographed emergencies — the forgotten camps, the unstrategic peoples — keep December 10 as they keep every day, unobserved. And the doctrine's own older caution, which the school adds from the tradition's store: a feast, in every room of this building, is a means and not the thing itself — the seder is not the Exodus, the mass is not the mercy — and the standard's day, kept as an end, becomes the standard's mausoleum, visited annually and lived in never. The movement's honest teachers say all of this themselves, in the day's own programs, which the school counts as the observance's health: a feast whose sermon includes the feast's insufficiency is not yet a ritual only.
The lesson's last word sets the day in the tradition's calendar — or rather, notes that the tradition, having no calendar, has adopted this one date as its own, and that the adoption is itself the doctrine's modern biography in miniature. A philosophy that began in a porch and a grove, that was systematized by friars who had the Church's whole year of feasts at their disposal, keeps in its secular age exactly one feast, borrowed from a committee's anniversary and shared with a dynamite-maker's prize — and keeps it not with a liturgy but with a reading, a theme, and a vigil. The school's student should find the spareness fitting rather than sad: the doctrine's feasts were always arguments, and December 10 is the argument's annual restatement — the standard read aloud in the schools, named in the prisons' direction, and measured, for one day, against the year's record by the only tribunal the doctrine has ever finally trusted, which is the informed conscience of whoever is listening. The celebrations continue with the feast the doctrine did not make but cannot refuse: the turning of the year in nature itself, the winter solstice.
Lesson 2: The winter solstice — nature's turning point: history and observance
The winter solstice — the shortest day and longest night of the northern year, falling on December 21 or 22 — is the one feast in this school that its subject did not create and cannot claim: a turning point of the earth itself, older than every doctrine in the building, which the natural-law tradition has adopted, in this curriculum, as its borrowed festival — and the lesson must explain the borrowing honestly before it celebrates it. The tradition's own feasts are anniversaries of texts and persons; the solstice is an anniversary of nothing human, the day the sun, having declined to its farthest south, stands still — solstitium, the sun standing — and turns. Every ancient civilization of the northern hemisphere marked it, because every one of them lived by the light it promised to return: the Roman Saturnalia and the feast of Sol Invictus, the Unconquered Sun, on December 25; the Germanic Yule, whose log and evergreen passed into the Christmas that absorbed the season; the Persian Shab-e Yalda, the night of birth, kept with pomegranates and poetry against the longest dark; the Chinese Dongzhi, when the yang begins its return and families eat the dumplings of reunion; the fire festivals and the stone circles — Newgrange's chamber, older than the pyramids, aligned so that the solstice dawn enters once a year and lights the inner room — by which the neolithic farmers built the turning into their architecture, a sermon in stone on the dependability of the order the doctrine calls nature.
Why a school of natural law keeps the solstice is the lesson's second movement, and the answer is the doctrine's cosmology made festive. Natural law's first claim, from the foundations, is that the universe runs by an order reason can discover — and the solstice is that order's most ancient classroom: the day on which the peasant and the astronomer possess the same knowledge, that the darkness has a limit set by the structure of things and not by anyone's decree, that the light returns not because it is willed or voted but because that is what the world does. The tradition's teachers have used the turning for exactly this parable in every age: the Stoics' cosmic sympathy, the medieval computists who set the Nativity's feast in the solstice's week so that the returning light should preach, the Enlightenment's philosophes who made the solstice a festival of reason against the dark of superstition — the French Revolution's calendar-makers among them — and the modern secular congregations, the humanist and naturalist communities, who keep it still as the year's honest feast, needing no doctrine but the earth's. The school's student should note what kind of observance this is for a doctrine with no rites: not a sacrament but a reminder, kept at the level of the hearth — a fire lit, a meal shared, the darkest day named and watched turn — the cosmology celebrated by the only liturgy nature provides, which is attention.
The observance's modern forms complete the picture, and the school gives them with the same fairness it gives the building's other feasts. The neopagan communities — whose own school stands elsewhere in this curriculum — keep the solstice as Yule, one of their year's eight great festivals, with a liturgy of their own that this lesson respects and does not borrow. The secular solstice celebrations of the humanist movement — the Sunday Assembly's and the naturalists' gatherings, the solstice concerts and the lantern walks — keep it as the feast of the returning light in a purely natural key: the astronomer's facts sung, literally, in carols rewritten for the cosmos, a form the movement's critics find thin and its keepers find sufficient, the argument being the familiar one of this building's every feast, between the rite's sufficiency and its honesty. And beneath all the forms stands the observance nobody organizes: the whole northern world's instinct, in the darkest week, to light the windows and gather at the table — the Christmas lights and the holiday season's whole economy of candles being, whatever their theologies, the species' annual answer to the same fact the stone chamber at Newgrange was built to catch. The school records the instinct as the lesson's evidence: the turning is the one feast that requires no belief to keep, only a latitude and a winter.
The lesson's last word draws the solstice into the doctrine's own teaching, where this curriculum has placed it — as the celebrations semester's meditation on the word nature itself. The doctrine is named for nature, and its critics have always asked which nature: the nature that devours its young and freezes the unprepared, or the nature of the moralists' treatises, conveniently humane? The solstice is the school's answer in the form of a feast: the nature the doctrine trusts is neither the idyll nor the slaughterhouse but the order — the discoverable, dependable structure in which the light's return is a fact before it is a metaphor, and in which a rational animal can therefore build, on the turning of a planet, the whole architecture of hope that does not depend on hope's deserving. The student who keeps the feast as this school keeps it — a fire, a table, the longest night named aloud, and the morning watched for — has performed the doctrine's cosmology as its teachers always intended it to be performed: not believed, but noticed. The celebrations turn from the calendar to the company: the discussion groups and the rights organizations in which this doctrine, having no church, keeps its congregation.
Lesson 3: Philosophy discussion groups and human rights organizations
The third celebrations lesson surveys the doctrine's congregation — the communities in which natural law, having no church, actually assembles: the philosophy discussion group, where its texts are kept alive by argument, and the human rights organization, where its standard is kept alive by work. The school treats them in one lesson because they are the tradition's two hands, and because their separation — the talkers in one room, the workers in another — is the modern form of the doctrine's oldest temptation, against which the whole course has been a warning. The discussion group first, in its real modern variety: the university seminar and the philosophy society; the reading group in the library and the congregation's adult class; the pub philosophy night and the prison reading circle — the last being, by the testimony of those who run them, among the practice's most serious addresses, the Antigone read by men whom the state holds being an experience its facilitators describe in terms that recall the doctrine's origins among the powerless. The group's constitution is the one Year One's practice lesson codified: the text governs, the objections lead, the persons are exempt, the session ends in judgment — and its product is the doctrine's only sacrament, the formed judgment of its members, carried out of the room into the desks and the streets where the course has followed it.
The human rights organization, the second community, is the doctrine's modern order of friars, and the lesson gives its history in the depth its rank deserves. Its genealogy runs from the abolition societies and the Congo Reform Association — the first modern human-rights campaign, whose lantern-slide lectures and mass meetings forced a king to surrender his private colony — through the International League and the wartime planners, to the movement's modern form, founded in a London lawyer's newspaper appeal of 1961: Peter Benenson's 'Appeal for Amnesty,' which filled a hall and became Amnesty International, an organization built on the doctrine's own architecture — the standard professed by the governments, the violations documented to a court's standard, the pressure applied by the world's conscience in the form, at first, of letters: the prisoner of conscience adopted by a local group, whose members wrote to the jailers monthly, for years, in the practice's most characteristic act, the refusal to let a name be forgotten. Around Amnesty grew the movement's ecology: Human Rights Watch, with its researchers and its reports aimed at the powerful's own capitals; the professional guilds — the lawyers', doctors', and journalists' defense committees; the documentation centers and the tribunals' evidence archives; and the local organizations of the unfree countries themselves, whose members work at the price the last lesson recorded, and whose reports the international movement exists to amplify and to shelter behind.
The two communities' relation is the lesson's third movement, and it is given as the tradition's teachers give it — as a mutual correction without which each corrupts. The discussion group corrects the organization against the slogan: the standard debased into the flag, the rights language become a faction's property, are repaired in the seminar, where the doctrine's reasons are still examinable and its catalogue still argued — the organization's workers being, in the movement's own best tradition, sent back to the texts as the friars were sent back to the Summa, lest the conclusions outlive the reasons in their own house first. The organization corrects the group against the theater: the seminar that has discussed Antigone for a decade and never written a letter is recalled, by the adopted prisoner's file on the table, to the practice's point — that the doctrine's judgment exists for the act, and that its community is finally measured not by the quality of its arguments but by the names it refused to forget. The school's student should see the two rooms as one community with two doors, and the health of the whole in the traffic between them: the letters written by people who have read the treatise, the treatise read by people who have written the letters.
The lesson's last word is the community's own account of why it assembles at all, which the school takes from the movement's practice rather than its charters. A standard that no one keeps is a text; a text that no one argues is a relic; and the doctrine's survival across twenty centuries — the history semester's puzzle — is explained, in the end, by neither its truth alone nor its institutions' strength, but by the recurrence, in every generation, of the two small rooms: the room where the book is open and the objections are staged, and the room where the names are read and the letters are written. The communities are not large, and the tradition has never promised that they would be; the porch held dozens, the lecture hall hundreds, the letter-writing group a dozen pensioners and students around a table with a file of prisoners' photographs. The school's closing sentence for the celebrations' survey of community is the movement's own arithmetic, which the student has met before in this building, in other rooms' currencies: the standard is kept the way the seder is kept and the solstice is kept — by whoever shows up, annually and weekly, in the room where it is kept. The semester's last lesson descends from the organizations to the smallest of the doctrine's assemblies: the law school's classroom, the civic class, and the family at its table, talking about fairness.
Lesson 4: Law school and civic classes and families talking about fairness at the table
The celebrations semester closes at the doctrine's smallest and most consequential assemblies: the law school classroom, where the standard's professional keepers are formed; the civic class, where the citizen's; and the family table, where — as Year One's practice lesson taught — the first school of fairness sits, and where the sentence with which this whole course began, 'that isn't fair,' is spoken for the first time by every future judge, dissident, and letter-writer the doctrine will ever have. The law school first. The modern lawyer's formation, in most of the world's faculties, runs through the case method: the student learns the law from the appellate reports, case by case, the professor's questions staging the objections in the quaestio's modern dress — and the doctrine's place in that formation is the argument the history semester recorded, between the positivist curriculum that teaches the law as it is and the older jurisprudence that asks, of every case, whether the law as it is is law at all. The student of this course should know the argument's classroom addresses: the jurisprudence seminar, the constitutional law course where the dignity clauses are glossed, the moot court where the unjust statute is pleaded against — and the clinical program, the law school's own letter-writing room, where students staff the asylum appeal and the death-row petition and learn the doctrine, as its friars learned it in the confessional, at the resolution of one person's case.
The civic class is the second assembly, and its modesty is deceptive, for it is the only room in the doctrine's whole architecture that reaches everyone. The school civics lesson — the constitution's structure, the rights' catalogue, the citizen's duties — is the Declaration's dissemination machinery at its most literal, the Assembly's 1950 invitation to teach the text in schools become, in the countries that accepted it, a generation's common moral vocabulary. The lesson gives the civic class its difficulties with the school's usual candor: the subject is the first cut in every budget crisis and the first conscript in every culture war, its content fought over by the camps precisely because its power is real — the fight over the civics curriculum being, in the doctrine's own analysis, a fight over the standard's custody, conducted by parties who agree on nothing except that whoever teaches the children the meaning of fairness will own the future's courtroom. Against the capture of the subject stands its oldest safeguard, which the tradition supplies: the text itself, short enough to be read entire in a class hour, in the students' own language — the Declaration's thirty articles being, by design, the one syllabus no ministry can quietly replace, since the whole world has copies.
The family table is the third assembly and the semester's true destination, and the lesson gives it the depth the whole course has earned for it. It is at the table that the doctrine's primary precepts are actually promulgated — not in the Summa's Latin but in the adjudication of the divided cake, the borrowed toy, the sibling's grievance heard and answered with reasons: the parents who explain the rule by its fairness are teaching natural law in its vernacular; the parents who rule by 'because I say so' are teaching positivism, and the child, who is the world's most incorruptible jurisprudence seminar, renders the verdict the tradition predicts — accepting the explained rule as law and the unexplained one as power, and remembering the difference for the bench, the bureau, or the prison cell of his future. The table's curriculum widens with the child: the news discussed, the unfairness in the story argued, the family's own decisions — the move, the money, the care of the grandparents — reasoned aloud in the children's hearing, the household conducted as a small republic of reasons. The tradition's teachers are unanimous on the table's rank, from the rabbis who made it an altar to the doctrine's modern sociologists: the standard survives its centuries of official neglect because it is re-founded nightly, in the vernacular, at the one institution no regime has ever managed to abolish.
The lesson's last word, and the celebrations semester's, gathers the doctrine's assemblies into the single picture the course has been assembling. A philosophy with no church keeps its feasts in a committee's anniversary and a planet's turning; its congregation in a seminar and a letter-writing circle; its seminaries in the law school's clinic and the schoolroom's civics hour; and its first altar at the family table, where the cake is divided under argument. The student who finds the architecture too humble for the doctrine's claims has the history semester to answer him: it was always thus — a porch, a grove, a friar's cell, a rented room in Philadelphia, a jail cell in Birmingham — the standard's addresses being, by a law the tradition itself might formulate, inversely proportional to the power of the regimes among which it is kept. The year's second half turns from the doctrine's assemblies to its ethics entire: justice and fairness, dignity and honesty, reason and responsibility, and the service in which the virtues are organized — the theory, at last, of everything the student has watched this community do.