Minister Destiny Marie Morgan Ministries, Inc.

Minister Destiny Testimony Schools

District: AWAKENING

Ministry name: Natural Law

Lessons — Adult Year 1, Semester 3

Adult Year 1 · Semester 3 — Texts and teachings

Four lessons for this semester. When you are ready, take the test for this semester.

Lesson 1: The writings of Thomas Aquinas on natural law: a guided overview

The texts semester opens with the doctrine's central book — or rather, with the treatise inside the book, since Aquinas's writings on natural law occupy a few dozen pages of a life's work that fills shelves, and the guided overview's first service is to give the student the address: the Summa Theologiae, Part One of the Second Part (Prima Secundae), questions 90 through 97, the Treatise on Law, with question 94 — on the natural law itself — as the treatise's heart. The overview walks the questions in their order, because the order is the argument. Question 90 defines law itself: an ordinance of reason, for the common good, made by the one who has care of the community, and promulgated — four conditions, each of which will exclude something the student has seen called law: the tyrant's whim fails reason, the faction's statute fails the common good, the usurper fails authority, the secret decree fails promulgation. Question 91 distinguishes the four laws of the foundations' ladder. Question 93 treats the eternal law; 94, the natural; 95 and 96, human law's derivation and its binding force — including the famous article on whether the unjust law binds, whose answer the course has used since the foundations; and 97, the question of law's change, in which Aquinas, the supposed fossil, argues that law should change as human conditions change, provided the change serves the common good — the system's built-in doctrine of reform.

Question 94 deserves the overview's closest stop, because it is the most argued-over six articles in moral philosophy. Its second article states the doctrine's core with a schoolman's economy: the natural law's precepts follow the order of human nature's inclinations — the inclination, shared with all substances, to preserve one's being, grounding the precepts that protect life; the inclination, shared with the animals, to sexual union and the rearing of offspring, grounding the law of marriage and education; and the inclinations proper to reason — to know the truth, above all about God, and to live in society — grounding the precepts against ignorance and offense. Its other articles answer the objections the student has already raised in this course: whether the natural law is the same for all (in its primary precepts, yes; in its conclusions, mostly, with failures the article itself catalogs); whether it can be abolished (the primaries cannot be blotted from the heart, though they can be obscured in application, as among the Germans of Caesar's report, who did not count theft wrong); whether it can change (by addition, yes; by subtraction from the primaries, no). The school's student should notice the candor of the architecture: the treatise builds its own difficulties into its articles, in the quaestio form — objections first, at full strength — so that the text teaches its reader how to argue with it, which is the scholastic method's whole point and the reason the book has trained minds for seven centuries.

Around the treatise stand the rest of Aquinas's writings on the subject, and the overview names the ones the student will meet in the wild: the Summa Contra Gentiles, the earlier summa addressed to the missionary's task among Muslims and Jews, whose third book works out the natural theology and the law's ends for readers who do not share the revelation — the doctrine's ecumenical instrument, natural law being precisely the part of Aquinas's system that does not presuppose the faith; the commentaries on Aristotle's Ethics and Politics, where the friar lectures the pagan text into the Christian schools; the little work On Kingship, with its doctrine that the king who becomes a tyrant forfeits the obedience he was instituted to serve; and the disputed questions and the letters, the working papers of a professor whose teaching office was itself an institution of the community the history lesson described. The school adds the textual fact the student needs for the modern debates: the Summa was unfinished at its author's death, and the treatise's authority in the tradition rests not on its completeness but on its adoption — by the schools, the codes, and the councils that made this friar's lecture notes into a civilization's common sense.

The overview's last word is a reading instruction, in the manner of the building's guided overviews. Read Aquinas as he asks to be read: slowly, article by article, the objections taken seriously as the author's own doubts before they are answered — because the Summa is not a catechism of conclusions but a gymnasium of judgment, and the student who extracts its theses without performing its arguments has the doctrine's skeleton without its muscle. Read him, second, in his century's company: with Aristotle open beside him and the Arabs' commentaries in the footnotes, because the treatise is a conversation across the civilizations — the Greek's nature, the Roman's law, the Arab's reason, the Jew's and Christian's God — and its catholicity of sources is its method's proof. And read him, finally, as the tradition's courts and confessors read him: as a working instrument, whose distinctions — end and author and form, primary and secondary, deduction and determination — were forged to decide real cases about real wages, real oaths, real tyrants. The Roman who gave the doctrine its sentence precedes the friar who gave it its system, and the tour now goes back twelve centuries to Cicero's dialogue, On the Laws.

Lesson 2: Cicero's On the Laws: a guided overview

The second text is the doctrine's founding dialogue: Cicero's De Legibus, On the Laws, written in the 50s and 40s BCE in the shadow of the Roman republic's collapse, unfinished and unpublished at its author's murder, and preserved — like so much of the ancient world — by the thread of the copyists. The overview begins with the work's form, because the form is part of the teaching: a dialogue in Cicero's own voice, with his brother Quintus and his friend Atticus, walking in the groves of his estate at Arpinum — the town of his birth, to which the republic's most famous new man had retired from a capital sliding toward civil war — and asking, in Plato's manner and against Plato's example, what law is before what the laws should be. The first book is the doctrine's charter, and the student should know its argument as he knows Cicero's sentence from the foundations: law is not a thing invented by human cleverness, nor the enactments of peoples, but something eternal, which rules the whole universe by its wisdom in command and prohibition — the highest reason, implanted in nature, which commands what ought to be done and forbids the opposite; and from this law, older than any written statute or any state, the justice of every human enactment is derived and measured.

Book One's anthropology is the overview's second stop, because Cicero grounds the law in a portrait of the human being that the whole tradition will copy. Human beings, alone of the animals, share in reason — the divine spark by which they can know the order they live in — and this shared reason is the ground of their shared law and their fellowship: there is no difference in kind between man and man, Cicero argues, whatever the differences of learning and fortune, and whoever defines a man by his reason will not divide the species by its accidents; we are all, by nature, born for justice, and right is founded not in opinion but in nature. The school's student should pause on the sentence's date — the first century before Christ, in a slaveholding republic — and on its author's own limits, for Cicero's universalism coexisted with the household and the empire it would take eighteen centuries to accuse in his own terms, the tradition's familiar pattern of a standard outrunning its author's world. Book Two turns from the foundation to the fabric: Cicero, playing legislator for an ideal Rome that is transparently the real one reformed, drafts a code of religious law — the priesthoods, the festivals, the auspices — arguing that the city's worship must be ordered to the one law's service, and preserving, in the drafting, the antiquarian's treasure of Rome's actual sacred law.

Book Three completes the dialogue with the magistrates: the offices of the republic — consuls, praetors, tribunes, the senate's authority — arranged as the one law's instruments, each power defined, limited, and balanced, in the constitution the American founders would study in this text and its companions as the anatomy of republican government. The dialogue's dramatic irony is the overview's necessary note: Cicero is designing, with perfect understanding, the machine that was already broken — the republic whose laws he codifies would murder him within the decade, at the order of a triumvir whose power no clause in Book Three could have prevented — and the tradition has always read the work in that light, as the doctrine's first lesson in its own limits: the law above laws does not enforce itself, and its codifier's hands, nailed to the rostra, are its permanent footnote. The text's survival is the irony's other half: the empire that killed the republic taught the dialogue in its schools, the Church that succeeded the empire copied it in its monasteries — Book One nearly entire, the later books in part — and the founders of a republic Cicero could not have imagined read him across eighteen centuries as a contemporary, which is what the doctrine claims its law makes of all honest reasoners.

The overview's last word places the dialogue in the student's hands with its two companions in the tradition's judgment. Read On the Laws with On the Republic, whose surviving fragments — recovered in the nineteenth century from beneath a later text in a Vatican palimpsest, the ancient world's most famous act of literary archaeology — contain the definition's twin passage and the Dream of Scipio's cosmic vision of the statesman's reward; and read it with the knowledge of what the dialogue form means in Cicero's hands: not a treatise wearing costumes, but the doctrine performed — three citizens, in a grove, in a dying republic, reasoning their way from a summer's walk to the eternal law, as if to prove by the scene itself that the law's discovery requires no temple, no king, and no permission. The tour's next text jumps two thousand years in a single step, from the grove at Arpinum to a committee room at Lake Success: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the doctrine's modern charter, drafted by the heirs of everyone the student has met so far.

Lesson 3: The Universal Declaration of Human Rights: a guided overview

The third text is the doctrine's modern charter, and the overview treats it with the same closeness as the friar and the Roman, because it deserves it: the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, adopted by the United Nations General Assembly at Paris on December 10, 1948 — forty-eight votes for, none against, eight abstentions — thirty articles in a preamble's frame, drafted in less than two years by the committee the history lessons named, and become, in the decades since, the most translated document in the world and the closest thing the species has produced to a common moral constitution. The preamble is the overview's first stop, because it is the doctrine's foundations restated for the modern age in seven recitals: the recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human family as the foundation of freedom, justice, and peace; the memory of the barbarous acts that outraged the conscience of mankind — the war just ended, unnamed and unmistakable; and the proclamation of the Declaration as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations — a standard, note, not a treaty: the document binds no court and commands no army, its authority from the first day being the authority the natural-law tradition has always claimed for its standard, the authority of a measure by which measures are judged.

The thirty articles divide, for the student's map, into the tradition's old provinces. The first two are the foundation stones: all human beings born free and equal in dignity and rights, endowed with reason and conscience — Chang's word — and entitled to the Declaration's whole catalogue without distinction of any kind. Articles 3 through 21 are the civil and political rights, the Lockean inheritance codified: life, liberty, and security; no slavery, no torture, no arbitrary arrest; equality before the law and the fair trial's full apparatus; privacy, movement, asylum, nationality, marriage by free consent, property, thought and religion, expression, assembly, and the vote in periodic and genuine elections — the citizen's armor against the state, article by article, each with its abuse of the recent past legible between the lines. Articles 22 through 27 are the economic, social, and cultural rights, the second generation the socialist and the developing worlds insisted stand beside the first: social security, work and its just conditions, rest, an adequate standard of living, education — free and compulsory in its elementary stages — and participation in the culture and the science of one's age. Articles 28 through 30 close the frame: the entitlement to an order in which the rights can be realized; the duties to the community without which personality cannot develop; and the final safeguard, that nothing in the Declaration may be read as licensing any state, group, or person to destroy the rights it proclaims — the charter's own anti-tyranny clause, aimed at its future abusers.

The drafting is the overview's second subject, because this text, uniquely in the course, has a fully documented birth, and its birth is its philosophy's best evidence. The committee's work survives in the records the historians mine: John Humphrey, the Canadian secretariat official whose first draft drew on every constitution and declaration the world's governments submitted — the Panamanian draft, resting on the American Law Institute's wartime work, among the most used; René Cassin's restructuring into the architectural form the final text keeps; the debates in which the Confucian Chang taught the committee the word conscience and the Lebanese Thomist Malik fought for the person's priority over the state; the Saudi abstention over marriage and religion, the Soviet bloc's over the freedoms' substance, South Africa's over the whole — the eight abstentions mapping the century's fault lines in advance. And behind the committee stands the fact the lesson must not lose: the drafters were instructed by catastrophe, men and women who had seen, in the phrase of the preamble they wrote, what a world without the standard does — the Declaration being, in the tradition's long biography, the doctrine's answer composed by its emergency, as at Salamanca and at Nuremberg, in the smoke of the thing it exists to prevent.

The overview's last word assesses the text by the tradition's own measures, as the course has taught the student to do. As law, the Declaration is deliberately nothing: a proclamation, whose articles became law only as the later covenants and constitutions enacted them — and as custom, the international lawyers argue, by the world's universal profession of them. As doctrine, it is the natural-law tradition's greatest modern achievement and its most exposed position in one: the conclusions of three thousand years, agreed by the species' delegates, with the reasons — as Maritain foresaw — left in the delegates' several pockets, unexamined in the text itself, which names dignity and conscience and nature's endowment without once arguing them. The school's student now knows where the arguments live: in the friar's treatise and the Roman's dialogue he has just read, and in the living schools that keep them. The Declaration is therefore best read, in this course's judgment, as the tradition's other books are read — as a standard whose authority is inseparable from the reasoning that built it, and whose survival, in the next emergency, will depend on whether its readers can still produce the reasons on demand. The texts semester closes with the question of the present: how the doctrine is interpreted and studied today.

Lesson 4: Interpretation and study today

The texts semester closes in the present tense: how natural law is interpreted and studied now — in the law schools where it survives as jurisprudence, in the revived philosophical schools, in the human-rights practice that uses its conclusions daily, and in the ordinary reader's hands, where the commandment of this building's courses — go and learn — applies to a doctrine with no congregation and every courtroom for its study house. The map of the present first. In the universities, the doctrine's study runs in three channels that rarely meet: the legal philosophers, for whom natural law is one position in the theory of law — Hart's positivism and Fuller's inner morality of law, Dworkin's rights as trumps and Finnis's restatement, argued in the journals as the discipline's permanent question of what law is; the Thomist and classical schools, in the seminaries and the Catholic universities and their secular fellow-travelers, where the Summa is lectured as it was in the thirteenth century, with the Salamanca commentators in the footnotes; and the historians, for whom the doctrine is an archive — the Tierney school demonstrating that the language of natural rights was forged by the twelfth-century canon lawyers, centuries before Locke, in glosses on Gratian that the textbooks had skipped. The school's student should register the map's moral: the doctrine is studied today by everyone except, in most places, the students of politics and law who will wield its conclusions — a curricular accident the tradition's historians record with the same dryness as its other deaths.

The interpretation's live frontiers are the lesson's second station, and they are the places where the doctrine's machinery is being rebuilt under load. The first frontier is the foundation itself: the argument, now two generations old, between the new natural law's basic goods — self-evident, underived, plural — and the classical school's derivation from nature's forms and ends, with the analytic philosophers auditing both; the argument matters beyond the faculties because it decides what kind of reason can be offered, in a plural society's courts, for the standard the courts already use. The second frontier is the catalogue: each generation's new claim arrives dressed as a right — to the internet, to a healthy environment, to death with assistance, against genetic discrimination — and the doctrine's machinery, the deduction from the goods and the dignity premise, is the sieve through which the claims are argued, in the legislatures and the journals, by people who often do not know the sieve's name. The third frontier is the oldest: the unjust law's doctrine under modern conditions, argued now over the conscientious official, the resisting judge, the whistleblower with the state's secrets in his hands — Aquinas's three failures of end, author, and form applied to the administrative state by its own servants, in the tradition's unbroken casuistical line from the confessional to the ethics hotline.

The practice of study, for the student who would continue, is the lesson's third station, and the school gives it as concretely as the sister courses gave theirs. The texts are open as they have never been: the Summa in a dozen translations and free to every reader on the networks; Cicero in the Loeb and the paperback; the Declaration in five hundred languages; the travaux of its drafting in the scholars' editions. The communities of study are where the course has taught the student to expect them — not a church, for this subject has none, but the reading group and the law school's jurisprudence seminar, the human-rights organization's training room, the philosophy society's evening argument — the chavruta of this building's most ecumenical room being any two readers with the text between them and the willingness to stage the objections at full strength, in the quaestio's manner. The school adds the practitioner's counsel that the tradition's own teachers give: study the doctrine in its cases, not only its treatises — the Salamanca lectures beside the conquest's record, the Declaration beside the abstentions, King's letter beside the Birmingham ordinances — because natural law, alone among the building's subjects, is a doctrine whose texts are verdicts, and whose verdicts are its texts.

The lesson's last word, and the texts semester's, returns the student to the school's standing question for every room: what is this subject, finally, asking of the person who studies it? The creeds of the building ask belief; the practices ask observance; natural law asks judgment — the formed habit of measuring the human law in front of one against the law one did not make, and of saying the measurement aloud when the case requires it, at the price the doctrine's witnesses have always paid in their several currencies. The student who has read the friar and the Roman and the Declaration with this course owns the instruments: the ladder, the precepts, the three failures, the dignity premise, and the objections — for the school has taught the objections as carefully as the doctrine, knowing that a standard which cannot survive its critics in the classroom will not survive them in the emergency. The practice semester now shows the doctrine at work in the only place it has ever finally lived: the conscience of the person at his desk, in his family, and in his city — thinking carefully about right and wrong, and standing, when the measurement requires it, where Antigone stood.

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