Adult Year 1 · Semester 2 — History
Four lessons for this semester. When you are ready, take the test for this semester.
Lesson 1: The origins of Natural Law
The history semester begins with the idea's birth, which the record places not in a scripture but in a crisis: the Greek city-states of the fifth and fourth centuries BCE, where the sophists' challenge — that justice is only convention, nomos, the rule of the stronger dressed in custom — forced the philosophers to ask whether anything is right by nature, physis, and not merely by enactment. Socrates, in Plato's telling, is the crisis's first hero: condemned by his city's lawful court, he refuses escape in the Crito out of reverence for the laws that reared him, yet in the Apology he tells the same city he would obey the god rather than its command to stop philosophizing — the two postures between which the whole natural-law tradition will forever steer, loyalty to law and loyalty beyond it, held by its founder in one life. Plato's Republic gives the question its metaphysical frame — justice as the soul's and the city's true order, knowable by reason's ascent — and Aristotle, the tradition's grandfather in the strict scholarly sense, gives it its working distinctions in the Nicomachean Ethics: natural justice, which has the same force everywhere and does not depend on opinion, against legal justice, which is indifferent before enactment; the universal law of the Rhetoric, which Antigone is quoted as invoking; and equity, epieikeia, the correction of law where the lawgiver's universal words fail the particular case — three instruments the tradition has used ever since.
The Stoics built the distinctions into a cosmos. Zeno of Citium, teaching in Athens around 300 BCE in the painted porch — the stoa that named the school — and his successors Chrysippus and, in Rome, Seneca, Epictetus, and the emperor Marcus Aurelius, taught that the universe is governed by logos, reason as a material and divine fire, and that the human being, carrying a spark of that reason, lives according to nature when he lives according to the law that reason discovers: one law for the one city of gods and men, the cosmopolis, in which slave and emperor — Epictetus was the one, Marcus the other — are fellow citizens by nature, whatever the statutes say. The school's student should mark what the Stoics added to the Greeks' question: universality with an address. Natural justice in Aristotle is a distinction; in the Stoa it is a citizenship, and the Roman lawyers who inherited it — Gaius, Ulpian, the jurists of the empire — wrote it into the law's own books as the ius gentium, the law common to all peoples, and the ius naturale above it, until Justinian's Institutes could open a law student's education with the sentence that justice is the constant and perpetual will to give each his due, and that there is a law nature has established among all men, observed equally by all peoples.
Rome's orator is the origins' third founder, and the history semester gives him his full stature because the tradition does. Marcus Tullius Cicero — lawyer, consul, the republic's defender against Catiline and Antony, murdered by the second triumvirate's proscription in 43 BCE, his head and hands nailed to the rostra from which he had spoken — wrote in his dialogues On the Republic and On the Laws the doctrine's most quoted pages: the definition of true law as right reason in agreement with nature, diffused among all men, constant, eternal, whose author is the one God — or, the secular reader may keep, the one moral order — and the consequence he drew without flinching, that a statute of the Roman people contradicting it, even a statute freeing a tyrant's crimes, is no more law than a gang's pact would be. Cicero's own life enacted the doctrine's price: he died for the republic the doctrine told him was nature's city, and his books, copied by the monks who disagreed with his gods, carried the doctrine through the empire's fall to the friars and the revolutionaries — the school's phrase for him being the tradition's own judgment, that natural law has had greater philosophers, but never a greater witness.
The origins lesson's last word is the seed's strangeness, which the student should carry into the whole history: the doctrine was born twice-guilty in its cradles. Athens executed its founder-figure and kept slaves; Rome crucified its dissidents and built its law's universality on an empire's roads; the Stoa's cosmopolis coexisted with the arena. The tradition's own historians do not hide this — they build on it the argument the foundations semester taught: that the idea's truth was never vouched by its birthplaces, and that its function from the first day was accusatory, a standard standing over the very civilizations that articulated it, waiting for the centuries — the abolitionist, the friar at Salamanca, the prisoner of conscience — who would pick it up and turn it, as it was designed to be turned, against the powers that had taught it to them. The early community that first made the doctrine a civilization's operating system is the next lesson's subject: a friar of the thirteenth century, and the schools that formed around his synthesis.
Lesson 2: Thomas Aquinas and the early community
The second history lesson takes up the doctrine's systematizer and the community that carried his synthesis — Thomas Aquinas (1225–1274), the Dominican friar of Aquino, and the schools, orders, and universities of the thirteenth century that made his account of natural law the Latin West's common teaching for four hundred years. The man first, in the outline his community preserved: born to a noble family of the kingdom of Sicily, educated at Monte Cassino and Naples, he joined the new Dominican order against his family's will — his brothers kidnapped him and held him a year in the family castle to break the vocation, the tradition's favorite proof that his quiet obstinacy was lifelong — and studied under Albert the Great at Paris and Cologne, where his silence and bulk earned him the students' name of the Dumb Ox, and Albert's prophecy, also preserved, that the ox's bellowing would fill the world. He taught at Paris in the years when Aristotle's recovered works — arriving through Arabic translation and commentary — were convulsing the universities, and his life's work was the reconciliation his order sent him to perform: the Summa Theologiae, unfinished at his death at forty-nine on the road to the Council of Lyons, after a experience in prayer, the tradition says, beside which he judged all he had written to be straw.
The synthesis the lesson must state, because the texts semester will open the book itself, is the Summa's Treatise on Law (Prima Secundae, questions 90–97), the most influential twenty pages in the doctrine's history. There the ladder of the foundations lesson is built: eternal law, the divine reason governing all things; natural law, the rational creature's participation in it, whose first principle — good is to be done and pursued, evil avoided — ramifies into the primary precepts following human nature's inclinations: to preserve life, to procreate and educate offspring, to know the truth and live in society; human law, derived from the natural by deduction and determination, binding in conscience exactly so far as it is just; and the doctrine of the unjust law as violence, with its prudential governor, that stands behind King in Birmingham. Around the treatise the community formed: the Dominican and Franciscan schools arguing the synthesis's every article — the Franciscans, from Scotus onward, pressing the will's primacy against Thomas's intellect, an argument about whether God could command the good or the good commands because God wills it, which is the natural-law tradition's internal version of the question every room in this building asks about its lawgiver; the commentators, Cajetan and the Salamanca school, carrying the text to the Indies question and the modern age.
The early community's other half is institutional, and the lesson gives it because ideas in this building are carried by communities or not at all. The thirteenth century built the doctrine's infrastructure: the universities — Paris, Oxford, Bologna — chartered corporations of masters and students where the Summa was lectured on in the schools' disputation method, the quaestio, in which every article is an argument staged between objections and replies, the form the student has already met as the Talmud's page in Latin dress; the mendicant orders, friars sworn to poverty and preaching, who staffed the chairs and the confessionals where the doctrine met the merchants' usury, the soldiers' orders, the wives' and husbands' cases — casuistry, the doctrine's applied branch, born in the confessional's privacy; and the canon lawyers of the Church's courts, whose decretals made natural law an operating jurisprudence — marriage's consent, the oath's binding force, the slave's baptismal standing argued in its terms — a full legal civilization running on the doctrine two centuries before the modern states borrowed it. The school's summary of the community is the historian's: Aquinas gave natural law its system, but the friars, the universities, and the courts gave it what systems need to outlive their authors — a profession.
The lesson's last word is the synthesis's fate in its own house, because the tradition's honesty about itself is the student's best protection against both its flatterers and its despisers. The Thomist synthesis was never the medieval Church's unchallenged possession: condemned articles of 1277 brushed its edges three years after Thomas's death; the nominalists dissolved its natures into names; the Reformation's founders suspected its reason as pride's instrument, even as Protestant jurists rebuilt the doctrine on their own foundations; and Rome itself did not crown Thomas until the nineteenth century, when Leo XIII's Aeterni Patris made Thomism the Church's official philosophy — six hundred years after the Dumb Ox's death, his bellowing still filling, as Albert promised, the schools. The school's student should take the pattern as the doctrine's signature in history: natural law is perpetually being buried by its custodians' rivals and perpetually dug up by its custodians' needs, because the questions it answers — what may the ruler not do, what does the stranger own, what is this law worth — recur in every generation's politics whether or not the philosophy faculties are attending. The growth, change, and reform of the doctrine's middle and modern centuries follow.
Lesson 3: Growth, change, and reform
The third history lesson follows the doctrine through its transformations — the centuries in which natural law was carried out of the friars' schools into the law of nations, the charters of revolutions, and the codes of the modern state, changing its custodians at every stage and its content, its critics say, more than its custodians admitted. The first transformation is the Spanish one the foundations already saluted: in the sixteenth century, as Spain's empire swallowed the Americas, the Salamanca school — Vitoria, Soto, Suárez — rebuilt Aquinas's doctrine into the ius gentium, the law of peoples, and turned it on the empire itself: Vitoria's lectures De Indis arguing that the Indians held true dominion over their lands and goods, that neither discovery nor unbelief voided their title, and that the conquest's legality failed the doctrine's own tests — lectures delivered in the conquerors' own university, to the conquerors' own sons, which is the tradition's characteristic way of reforming itself, from the lectern. Suárez's De Legibus gave the system its early-modern summa, distinguishing eternal, natural, and human law with a precision the Protestant jurists across the confessional frontier read as greedily as the Catholics — the doctrine becoming, in the century of religious war, the one syllabus both Europes shared.
The second transformation is the doctrine's secularization, and the lesson must handle it with the school's precision, because it is the hinge of the doctrine's modern fate. Grotius, the Dutch jurist who founded international law in De Iure Belli ac Pacis (1625), rebuilt natural law as a system that would hold, in his famous hypothesis, even if God did not exist — not atheism, but method: a law for a Europe whose common church was broken, grounded in human nature's sociability alone. Pufendorf systematized the secular version for the Protestant universities; Locke gave it its revolutionary form, translating the doctrine into the rights of life, liberty, and estate, held against kings, forfeited only to a social contract's terms, and recoverable by revolution when the trust is broken — the Second Treatise becoming, in the American and French declarations, the doctrine's political immortality. But the same centuries carried the counter-current the lesson must not hide: Hobbes, who took the tradition's vocabulary — laws of nature, covenants, rights — and rebuilt it into the sovereign's absolute warrant, nature's law becoming the subject's duty to obey; and after him the utilitarians and the positivists, Bentham dismissing natural rights as nonsense upon stilts, Austin reducing law to the sovereign's command — the doctrine's vocabulary surviving, in its enemies' mouths, as the tribute error pays to truth, until by 1900 the faculties of Europe pronounced natural law dead, a pre-modern ghost in a disenchanted world.
The third transformation is the resurrection, and it is the twentieth century's own work, which the foundations lesson saluted at Nuremberg and the lesson now places in the doctrine's biography. The positivist century produced, in its middle, the spectacle that revived the doctrine by refuting its rival in practice: a legal order, the Third Reich's, in which lawyers and judges who had been taught that law is only enactment found themselves the instruments of enactments that were crimes — and the postwar reckoning reached, as Radbruch reached, for the older standard. The Universal Declaration of 1948 is the resurrection's monument: rights grounded in inherent dignity, proclaimed by a world organization, and carried within a generation into the European Convention's court at Strasbourg, the postcolonial constitutions, the American civil rights movement's briefs, and the tribunals for Yugoslavia and Rwanda — the doctrine's vocabulary become the operating language of international order, even where its philosophy remains unexamined. The philosophers followed the lawyers, as they had at Salamanca: the new natural law school of Finnis and Grisez rebuilt the doctrine for a pluralist age on the basic goods, deliberately bracketing the cosmic and theological scaffolding the tradition's older form required, while the Thomists of the old school answered that a doctrine so bracketed has kept the conclusions and mislaid the reasons — the tradition arguing, in its seventh century of print, in its own terms, about its own foundations, which the school has taught the student to recognize as the sign of its life.
The lesson's last word is the pattern of the transformations, stated as the tradition's philosophy of its own history. Natural law has died, by its obituarists' count, at least four times — with the sophists' Athens, with the empire's fall, with Hobbes and Bentham, with the positivist faculties — and has been resurrected each time not by its professors but by its emergencies: the conquered Indian, the broken continent, the enslaved citizen, the defendant at Nuremberg, each reaching for a law above the law that was crushing him and finding the old doctrine in the armory, dusted and serviceable. The school's judgment, offered as this lesson's keepsake, is that the doctrine's survival is neither accident nor conspiracy but function: so long as there are enactments that men must judge, there will be a standard by which they judge them, and they will call it, in whatever century's vocabulary, the law of nature. The modern world, in which that standard now operates as the human-rights system entire, is the final history lesson's subject.
Lesson 4: Natural Law in the modern world
The final history lesson surveys the doctrine's present estate — a condition the student should find genuinely strange, because natural law in the modern world is at once triumphant and homeless: its conclusions govern the planet's public law while its philosophy is taught in few of the planet's faculties, a standard everyone uses and few defend, which is either the doctrine's final victory or its most dangerous hour, and the lesson will end by weighing the two. The triumph first, in its institutional facts. The Universal Declaration's progeny now covers the earth: the two Covenants of 1966, on civil-political and economic-social rights; the conventions against torture, against racial discrimination, for the rights of the child; the European Court of Human Rights, whose judgments bind forty-six states; the Inter-American and African systems; the International Criminal Court, sitting in judgment on individuals for crimes against a law their states may not have enacted — the Nuremberg principle made permanent. Inside the states, the doctrine's language does the same work under other flags: the dignity clause of the German Basic Law, written in 1949 as the anti-Nazi constitution's first article — 'Human dignity shall be inviolable' — placed deliberately beyond amendment, an eternal clause, by men who had learned what a legislature may do to a dignity it is allowed to touch; the rights jurisprudence of the postcolonial constitutions; the natural-law arguments still filed, by all camps, in the courts where abortion, euthanasia, marriage, and punishment are contested.
The homelessness is the triumph's shadow, and the lesson gives it in the critics' full strength, from both directions as this school requires. From the positivist direction: the human-rights system's own lawyers increasingly treat the rights as pure enactments — treaty texts, nothing above them — so that the standard that was meant to judge all law has become one more law, repealable in principle by the powers it was built to judge, its 'inherent dignity' a preamble's poetry with no court above the courts to cash it. From the communitarian and postcolonial directions: the charge that the universal rights are a local tradition in universal dress — the West's individualism exported with its gunboats first and its aid conditions after — answered by the record's awkward fact that the Declaration's drafters were nobody's puppets and its loudest modern champions include the dissidents of every continent against their own governments, who rarely experience the rights as a foreign imposition when the prison door closes. And from inside the doctrine's own house: the argument between the old Thomists and the new natural lawyers, the Finnis school's bracketed goods against the classical school's natures and ends, now in its second generation — the tradition disputing its foundations with undiminished energy in the journals, while the world outside uses its conclusions with undiminished confidence, a division of labor the school's student should find either reassuring or ominous according to his philosophy of how long conclusions outlive their reasons.
The modern world's live cases are the lesson's third station, because the doctrine today is best studied where it is working. It works in the tribunal and the constitutional court, where 'dignity' and 'inherent rights' do daily duty as the premises of judgments on torture, on the death penalty's slow retreat across the world's map, on the prisoner's and the refugee's claims against the states that hold them. It works in the bioethics committee and the medical chamber, where the questions the tradition was built for — what may be done to a human being, at life's beginning and its end, by doctors, by parents, by the state — are argued in a vocabulary of dignity and rights that every party to the argument shares even when their conclusions collide. And it works, least visibly and most consequentially, in the conscience of the ordinary official: the soldier refusing the unlawful order his training taught him to recognize, the clerk who will not sign, the judge who reads the statute against the constitution's dignity and finds it wanting — the doctrine's real modern institution being, as it was in the confessional's century, the formed conscience at the point of decision, multiplied by the millions of desks at which the modern world's law is actually administered.
The lesson's last word, and the history semester's, weighs the triumph and the homelessness together and leaves the weighing, as this school leaves its subjects' open questions, with the student — but not without the school's own finding, earned across the semester. The doctrine's conclusions have never been safer and its reasons never less examined; every previous age that used the conclusions while neglecting the reasons — the slaveholding republic quoting Locke is the type — eventually presented the bill, in the currency of the contradiction's victims. The modern world's question about natural law is therefore not whether it is true, which the philosophy faculties will argue into the next century, but whether a civilization can keep a standard it has stopped being able to state — whether the rights can survive their foundations' forgetting, as a cut flower survives its root, beautifully and briefly. The texts semester now opens the doctrine's books — the friar's treatise, the Roman's dialogue, and the Declaration itself — in which the reasons are kept, for the students of the next emergency, in the armory where they have always waited.