Adult Year 1 · Semester 1 — Foundations
Four lessons for this semester. When you are ready, take the test for this semester.
Lesson 1: Natural Law: an adult introduction
Natural law is the oldest idea in this building that is not a religion: the conviction that right and wrong are not invented by rulers, majorities, or even by revelation, but belong to the nature of things — that there is a law above human law, written into what human beings are, which reason can discover and by which every statute, custom, and command may be judged. The adult introduction must define it with care, because the phrase misleads twice: it is not the law of nature that governs falling stones and orbiting planets, though its thinkers borrowed the cosmos's order as their model; and it is not a code that any church or state owns, though churches and states have both claimed it. Natural law, as its tradition from the Greek Stoics through Cicero, Aquinas, and Locke to the modern human-rights movement presents it, is the claim that some things are owed to every person simply because he is a person — life, liberty, the keeping of promises, the protection of the innocent — that these obligations can be known by any honest reasoner, and that a human law commanding their violation is, in the tradition's deliberate paradox, not truly law at all: lex iniusta non est lex, an unjust law is not a law.
The idea's architecture rests on three claims the foundations semester will take in turn. First, that human beings have a nature — a characteristic way of flourishing, with goods that belong to it as roots belong to a tree: life itself, knowledge, family and friendship, work and play, and the worship or contemplation that most of the tradition's teachers add — and that this nature is the same in every person, in every country, in every century, which is why the law built on it claims to be universal. Second, that reason can know this nature and its goods: the tradition's epistemology is deliberately democratic, holding that the basic principles of right and wrong are self-evident to practical reason — Aquinas's word is synderesis, the innate grasp that good is to be done and evil avoided — so that the peasant and the philosopher stand, at the foundation, on the same ground. Third, that human law derives its authority from its conformity to this deeper law: the legislator is a trustee, not an inventor, of justice, and the citizen's obedience is owed to law as law, not to power as power — the distinction on which every resistance theory, every declaration of rights, and every war-crimes tribunal in the modern world silently stands.
The introduction must also give the idea's company honestly, because natural law has never belonged to one camp, and its guest list is the surprise that makes the subject worth a school of its own. Its founders were pagan Stoics; its greatest systematizer a Catholic friar; its early-modern transmitters include Protestant jurists like Grotius — who famously held that natural law would stand 'even if we were to grant there is no God' — and the Catholic scholastics of Salamanca who used it to defend the rights of the American Indians against their own king's empire; its political form was written by Locke, a Christian philosopher, into the charter of revolutions; and its modern form, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, was drafted by a committee of a Confucian, a Lebanese Christian, a French Jew, an American Protestant, and delegates of every civilization, who agreed on the rights, as the philosopher Jacques Maritain said of the drafting, on condition that no one asked them why. The school's student should hold this breadth as the subject's defining fact: natural law is the closest thing the moral world has to a common language, spoken with many accents and owned by none.
The course ahead follows the building's order: this semester's foundations — rights by nature and reason's knowledge of them, human law's duty to match the deeper law, the dignity no ruler may take, and the ordered universe the tradition takes as its model — then the history from the Stoics' porch to the modern tribunals, the texts in guided overview, and the practice of the examined conscience. A word of method, in the spirit this school brings to every room: natural law is studied here as the building studies every worldview — from inside, in its own strongest form, with its critics given their full say in their turn — because the idea makes a claim on the student that a creed does not: it claims that he already knows its first principles, and that the course is not teaching him a new law but showing him the one he has been using every time he has ever said, of any rule anywhere, 'that isn't fair.' The foundations begin with exactly that sentence, taken in depth.
Lesson 2: Some rights belong to every person by nature and right and wrong can be known by reason in depth
The first foundation states the doctrine's heart, and the lesson takes its two halves in depth in the order the title gives them: first, that some rights belong to every person by nature; second, that right and wrong can be known by reason. Rights by nature — the phrase must be unpacked before it is believed or doubted, because its meaning is precise. A right, in this tradition, is a claim that others are bound to respect: my right to life is your duty not to kill me, and the magistrate's duty to protect me. To say the right is natural is to say three things about it: that I hold it not by grant — no king issued it, no majority voted it, and neither can repeal it; that I hold it equally — the slave and the senator, in Cicero's Rome as in the student's city, hold the same title, whatever their legal status says; and that I hold it prior to society — it is the standard by which society's arrangements are judged, not society's product. The tradition's classic list grows from the nature it describes: life, because the living being's first good is to be; liberty, because a rational being is made to direct itself; property, in Locke's development, because labor mixes a person's own powers with the world; and the rights of conscience, family, and fair judgment that the later tradition draws from the same root.
The claim's history is the proof of its power and the record of its betrayals, and the lesson gives both, because this school gives every subject its record entire. For most of the tradition's long life, the rights it named were honored in the breach by the very civilizations that praised them: Cicero's Rome held slaves; Aquinas's Europe burned heretics; Locke's England traded in human beings, and Locke himself held investments the historians do not let his readers forget; the American republic that declared all men created equal held millions in bondage under its flag. The natural-law tradition's own verdict on this record is the sharpest available, and the school gives it in the tradition's own voice: the doctrine does not stand or fall by its professors' practice, because its whole point is to supply the standard by which that practice is condemned — and it was in fact condemned, in every age, in the doctrine's own terms, by the abolitionists who quoted Locke against the slaveholders, the Salamanca friars against the conquistadors, and the enslaved themselves, who needed no philosopher to tell them their title. A standard betrayed is not thereby disproved; it is thereby used.
The second half of the foundation — that right and wrong can be known by reason — is the doctrine's epistemology, and it must be stated as carefully as the first. The tradition does not claim that every moral question is easy, or that reasoners never disagree; it claims that the first principles are self-evident and the same for all: that good is to be done and evil avoided; that innocent life is not to be taken directly; that promises bind, debts are to be paid, the other's goods are not to be taken, each is to be given his due — principles Aquinas called the primary precepts, known, he said, to everyone, in every place, as the conclusions of a geometry are known once the terms are understood. From the primaries, reason descends by deduction and judgment to the secondary precepts and the hard cases, and there the tradition is candid about the difficulties: conclusions can be obscured by custom, by passion, by bad education — Aquinas himself notes peoples among whom theft was not counted wrong, the principle buried under the practice — so that the doctrine's claim is not that every conscience is a reliable instrument, but that conscience has an object: there is something there to be known, and the knowing can be corrected, argued, and taught, which is why this subject has schools.
The lesson's last word sets the foundation against its great modern rival, because the student will meet the rival everywhere and should meet it first at full strength. The rival is legal positivism and its parent, moral relativism: the claim that law is only what is enacted, and right only what a culture approves — that 'unjust law' is a contradiction the tradition invented and 'rights by nature' a poetry the strong recite. The tradition's answer is the one the twentieth century wrote in court records: at Nuremberg, the defendants pleaded that their acts were legal under the law of their state, and the tribunal — reaching, in its judgment, for the older language — convicted them under a law they were held to have known as men, a law above the Reich's statutes; and the German jurist Radbruch, who had been a positivist, concluded from the catastrophe that there are principles of justice higher than any enactment, and that a statute of extreme injustice is not law. The school does not ask the student to sign the doctrine; it asks him to see what the doctrine is for. The next foundation follows the claim into the legislator's chamber: if rights are nature's, then human law's whole duty is to match the deeper law — and dignity is the name of what no ruler may take away.
Lesson 3: Human laws should match the deeper law of nature and every person has dignity that no ruler may take away in depth
The second foundation carries the first into the city: if rights belong to persons by nature, then human law — the statute, the constitution, the judge's sentence — stands under a standard it did not make, and its whole authority is borrowed from its conformity to that standard. The tradition states the relation in a ladder the student should learn as Aquinas built it, because the ladder is the doctrine's complete political theory in four rungs. At the top stands the eternal law: the rational order of the universe itself, God's governance of all things — or, in the secular translations the later tradition permits, the moral structure of reality. Below it, the natural law: that same order as participated in by rational creatures, who can know it and direct themselves by it — the foundations' subject so far. Below that, human law: the determinations by which each community applies the natural law to its own circumstances — traffic's side of the road, taxation's forms, the procedures of courts — free in its details, bound in its principles, deriving, in Aquinas's formula, all its force as law from the natural law it serves. And at the ladder's foot, the warning: a human enactment that contradicts the natural law is, in the formula the tradition never softened, an act of violence rather than a law, binding no one in conscience — the seed from which the theories of resistance, conscientious refusal, and civil disobedience have grown in every century since.
Dignity is the foundation's second term, and it names what the ladder protects. Every person has dignity — worth — that no ruler may take away: the claim must be stated in its full strength to be understood, because the tradition does not mean that persons should be treated as if they had worth, as a courtesy; it means they have it, as a fact of their nature, prior to every social arrangement, so that the slave in chains possesses, at this moment and in full, the same dignity as the emperor who chained him — the emperor's law can violate it but cannot diminish it, because it was never the emperor's to give. The tradition grounds the dignity variously, and the school gives the grounds in their plurality as it gave the drafters': the religious ground, that the person is made in God's image and is an end, never a mere means; the rational ground, in Kant's secular restatement, that a rational nature exists as an end in itself, having a dignity beyond all price; and the natural lawyer's own ground, that a being who can know the good and choose it is the kind of thing whose flourishing is an intrinsic good, not an instrument of another's. On the grounds the tradition argues; on the dignity it does not — the dignity is the premise the arguments share, the fixed point from which, in 1948, the world's delegates could write 'inherent dignity' into the Declaration's first line and mean, for once, the same words.
The foundation's practical edge is the doctrine of the unjust law's treatment, and the lesson gives it with the tradition's own care, because it is the most dangerous idea in this school and the tradition knew it. An unjust law, in Aquinas's distinctions, may fail in three ways: in its end, when the ruler legislates for his own advantage; in its author, when he exceeds his authority; in its form, when its burdens fall unequally — and such laws, he concludes, do not bind in conscience, except where disobedience would cause scandal or greater disorder, a prudential exception the tradition keeps beside the principle as its governor. The tradition's martyrs and heroes are the doctrine's case law: Antigone burying her brother against Creon's edict, in the play Year Two will read entire, appealing to the unwritten laws that are not of today or yesterday; the early Christians before the magistrates; and in the modern age, the doctrine's most famous application — the Letter from Birmingham Jail, in which Martin Luther King Jr., quoting Aquinas by name, wrote that an unjust law is a human law not rooted in eternal and natural law, and that one who breaks it openly, lovingly, and with willingness to accept the penalty is expressing the highest respect for law. The school gives the letter's presence in this lesson its due: it is the foundation's proof that the doctrine is not a museum piece but an instrument still in the hands of those who need it.
The lesson's last word is the foundation's limit, stated as honestly as its claim, because the school owes the student the doctrine's difficulties with its doctrines. A standard above human law invites the question every student asks by this point: who decides? — and the tradition's answer is deliberately unsatisfying to the impatient: reason decides, in public, by argument, under the discipline of the principles and the record of the cases — there is no natural-law court above the courts, no oracle of the deeper law, only the same slow machinery of judgment by which all moral knowledge advances, with its errors confessed in the tradition's own history, where yesterday's 'nature' (the natural slave of Aristotle's politics, the natural subjection of women in a hundred treatises) stands corrected by today's closer reading of the same nature. The doctrine's defenders call this not a weakness but the price of its one great advantage: a standard that no one owns cannot be captured — not by the ruler it judges, and not by the rebel it arms — and its correction is always possible in its own terms. The foundations close with the widest of its claims: that the universe itself runs by an order reason can discover — the cosmos as the doctrine's first book.
Lesson 4: The universe runs by order we can discover and thinkers from many religions and no religion have taught natural law in depth
The third foundation is the doctrine's cosmology — its picture of the universe — and its roll of teachers, and the lesson takes them together because in this tradition the two are one claim: the universe runs by an order that reason can discover, and the proof offered is that reasoners of every civilization and creed, working independently, have discovered the same order's moral part. The cosmology first. The tradition's universe is not a chaos onto which human beings project their preferences: it is intelligible — structured by forms and ends, natures that act for purposes, a whole in which the acorn is for the oak and the eye is for seeing and the rational animal is for knowing and choosing the good. This teleology — the doctrine of ends — is the load-bearing wall of the whole building, and the lesson must say so plainly, because the modern sciences' universe, of mechanism without purpose, is the strongest objection the doctrine faces, and the tradition's philosophers know it: the contemporary natural lawyers divide between those who rebuild the ethics on the human goods directly, without the cosmic scaffolding — the 'new natural law' of Finnis and his school, which begins from the self-evident goods of human flourishing rather than from nature's purposes — and those who hold that the scaffolding stands, that a biology which cannot stop speaking of functions and malfunctions has not abolished ends but only declined to discuss them. The school gives the division as the doctrine's live frontier, and notes the agreement beneath it: on the goods, and on reason's power to know them, the camps are one.
The roll of teachers is the lesson's second half, and it is deliberately ecumenical past the point any creed's syllabus would permit — the school presents it as the tradition presents itself, a relay across civilizations. The Stoics of Greece and Rome run the first leg: Zeno and Chrysippus teaching the law of nature as the right reason pervading the cosmos, Cicero giving it its immortal sentence — true law is right reason in agreement with nature, one law eternal and unchangeable, binding all nations and all times, whose author and judge is God, or, in the secular reading the text survives, the moral order itself. The rabbis run a parallel leg the syllabus honors: the Noahide laws, the seven commandments Judaism holds binding on all humanity, are a natural law in everything but the Greek name — morality for the nations, known without Sinai. The Church Fathers and the medieval schools take the baton: Paul's letter to the Romans supplying the tradition's proof-text — the Gentiles who do by nature what the law requires have the law written on their hearts — Aquinas building the system, the Salamanca scholastics carrying it to the Indies' defense. Islam's philosophers belong in the relay by the record's plain fact: the Mu'tazilite theologians held that good and evil are known by reason independently of revelation, against the Ash'arite voluntarists who made God's command the sole standard — the same argument, in Arabic, that Latin Christendom had with itself — and Confucius's Heaven and the Chinese tradition's li, the order of propriety written into the cosmos, stand in the school's comparative margin as the doctrine's far-eastern cousin, discovered independently on the other side of the world.
The relay's modern legs bring the roll to the student's own century, and the lesson names the carriers the history semester will meet in their stories: Grotius, systematizing the law of nations on nature's foundation in a Europe of religious war, precisely so that Catholic and Protestant, having no common church, might have a common law; Locke, converting the doctrine into the rights of Englishmen and then of all men; the American founders, inscribing 'the Laws of Nature and of Nature's God' in their Declaration's first sentence as the warrant of a revolution; and the drafters of 1948, the relay's most improbable leg — Chang the Confucian insisting the Declaration carry conscience in its first article, Malik the Lebanese Thomist its dignity, Cassin the French jurist its architecture, Roosevelt its chairmanship — men and women who shared no creed and produced, in Maritain's summary, agreement on the rights because each could ground them in his own why. The school's student should let the roll's diversity do its argumentative work: a doctrine independently reached by Stoic and rabbi, friar and Mu'tazilite, revolutionary and diplomat, is either a human universal or the most successful coincidence in intellectual history, and the tradition rests its case, in this foundation, on exactly that improbability.
The lesson's last word returns the foundations to their beginning, now with the whole structure in view. The student has the doctrine entire: a nature with goods, a reason that knows them, a law above laws, a dignity beneath all dignity's violations, and a cosmos whose order the moral law mirrors — taught, across three thousand years, by pagans and Jews, Christians and Muslims, believers and the explicitly godless hypothesis of Grotius, in the world's law schools and in its gaols. The school has given the doctrine in its strongest form, as its method requires; the history semester will now give it its biography — the porch at Athens, the forum at Rome, the friar's cell, the revolutionary's desk, the tribunal's bench — with the record's betrayals and corrections in their places, because a doctrine, like a person in this building's other rooms, is known by its life as well as by its claims. The origins follow.