Adult Year 1 · Semester 2 — History
Four lessons for this semester. When you are ready, take the test for this semester.
Lesson 1: The origins of Juche
The history semester opens with the doctrine's origins — which exist, characteristically for this room, in two accounts that the lesson keeps separate: the doctrine's own genealogy and the historians'. The doctrine's account: Juche was founded by Kim Il Sung in the anti-Japanese revolutionary struggle, its founding moment conventionally dated to June 1930 and the Kalun meeting in Manchuria, where the eighteen-year-old Kim (the official biography's account) rejected the older nationalists' and communists' reliance on foreign approval and great-power sponsorship, and set the Korean revolution on its own feet — the “Juche orientation” of the guerrilla years: the Korean communists making their own line in their own mountains, beholden neither to the Comintern's distant instructions nor to the Chinese party in whose territory they fought. The historians' account: the documentary record of the 1930s shows a young guerrilla leader of genuine ability within the Manchurian movement (the Korean units operating inside the Chinese Communist Party's structure, Kim rising through it, his 1931 membership in the CCP a matter of record), the name and the system of Juche appearing in the documents only in the 1950s — the word's first major use in Kim's speech of December 28, 1955, “On Eliminating Dogmatism and Formalism and Establishing Juche in Ideological Work,” addressed to party propagandists in the aftermath of de-Stalinization's first tremors and aimed, by its text, at the Korean cadres who copied Soviet forms and neglected Korean history and reality: the speech's “Juche” being, in its own context, a party-work slogan (know Korea, use Korean materials, stop aping the foreign) rather than the finished philosophy the 1982 treatise would present — the doctrine's growth from a slogan into a system across the following three decades being, in the historians' reading, the actual origins story, and the Kalun date its retrospective consecration.
The conditions that grew the slogan are the lesson's second half, and they are the peninsula's: the division of 1945 (the Soviet and American occupations hardening into two Korean states by 1948, each claiming the whole — the legitimacy contest that made “self-reliance” a fighting word: the Southern state visibly dependent on the American alliance, the Northern claiming the nationalist mantle of the state that stood alone); the Korean War (1950–53 — the North's invasion of the South, the American-led UN intervention, the Chinese armies' rescue of the North, the armistice at the original line: the war's lessons, as Pyongyang read them, being the doctrine's seedbed — that the nation's fate is decided by others when it cannot decide it itself, and that the great powers (Stalin's caution, Mao's terms) serve their own interests first); the reconstruction (the Soviet and Chinese aid withdrawn by the early 1960s, the economy rebuilt by the mobilization campaigns — the Chollima movement of 1956 onward, named for the winged horse of legend that flies a thousand ri a day, the Stakhanovite speed campaigns by which the doctrine's labor ethic was formed in practice before it was finished in theory); and the Sino-Soviet split (the 1960s' widening breach, in which the North maneuvered for its independence between the giants — condemning Khrushchev's revisionism with Beijing, then resisting Beijing's Cultural Revolution's pressure in turn, the Red Guard posters of 1966 denouncing Kim himself: the decade in which “Juche in ideology, independence in politics, self-sufficiency in the economy, self-reliance in defense” hardened from a posture into a formula (the 1965 Indonesia speech) and the leader's own line became, in the purges of the Kapsan faction (1967), the only line — the monolithic ideological system whose Ten Principles the texts semester will read). The origins' verdict, in the school's settlement: the doctrine was born of a real predicament — a small, divided, war-ruined nation's determination not to be a client's pawn — and was built, over thirty years, into a total system by the state that predicament created; the two facts are the history's whole, and neither cancels the other. The founder follows: the life at the system's center.
The origins' last word is a tree: on the slopes of the Paektu range and at the battle sites of the south Manchurian forests, the preserved “slogan trees” stand in their hundreds in the state's keeping, their bark inscriptions — “Long live General Kim Il Sung,” “Koreans, I am looking at you” — attributed to the guerrillas of the 1930s and protected under glass and guard as the revolution's first documents. The historians who have examined the trees divide between those who allow a core of genuine inscriptions, later multiplied, and those who file the forest entire under the cult's manufacture; the state allows no division at all. The school leaves the trees standing, as it leaves the doctrine's cradle and the archives' in their two groves — the student will find, in this room more than any other, that the evidence itself has been planted, tended, and fought over, and that knowing this is not the end of the study but its beginning.
Lesson 2: Kim Il Sung, founder of the Juche idea and the early community
The history semester's second lesson is the founder's life and the community he built — Kim Il Sung (1912–1994) — told, per this room's rule, in the two columns the record requires: the official biography that his state teaches, and the documentary history the outside scholars have assembled, with the agreements and the divergences marked. The agreed spine: born Kim Song Ju in Mangyongdae, near Pyongyang, in 1912, to a family of the Christian, nationalist lower middle class (his father a herbalist and anti-Japanese activist who died in Manchurian exile's hardships; the family's Presbyterian connections a documented fact the official biography mutes); educated in Manchuria after the family's exile; drawn into the communist youth movement; a guerrilla by his late teens in the Manchurian units; by the later 1930s a commander of a Korean division within the Chinese-led Northeast Anti-Japanese United Army, with real engagements to his name (the 1937 raid on Pochonbo, across the Korean border — a genuine operation, a police station and offices attacked and the town held for a night: the official biography's foundation deed, inflated in the telling to a turning point of the liberation, but not invented); driven by the Japanese counterinsurgency to the Soviet Far East by 1940–41, where he served as a captain in the Red Army's 88th Brigade of Korean and Chinese guerrillas (a documented service the official biography long omitted); returned to Korea in September 1945 aboard a Soviet vessel, presented to the Pyongyang crowds in October as the nation's guerrilla hero (with Soviet sponsorship the outside record documents and the official account denies was decisive); and rose, between 1945 and 1949, with Soviet backing and his own considerable political skill, through the elimination of rivals (the domestic communists, Cho Man Sik's nationalists, the Yan'an and Soviet factions in their turns) to the founding of the Democratic People's Republic (September 1948) and its premiership — the state he would rule for forty-six years.
The rule and the early community are the lesson's second half: the Korean War (his decision, with Stalin's approval and Mao's assent as the archives now document, to invade the South in June 1950 — the war that destroyed his state and was rebuilt from its ashes by the Chinese intervention and his own survival); the purges (the 1953–58 elimination of the Soviet and Yan'an factions after the war's failure, the August 1956 incident — the one open challenge to his leadership at a plenum, answered by the challengers' flight and the factions' destruction — and the Kapsan purge of 1967 completing the monolithic system: the community of the doctrine being, from that date, a community of one line); the building (the industrialization and the mobilizations of the origins lesson; the songbun system's classification of the whole population by loyalty's heredity; the cult's construction (the statues, the portraits, the Mangyongdae pilgrimage, the leader's birthdays entering the calendar) across the 1960s–70s, as the doctrine hardened); the succession arranged (Kim Jong Il's emergence through the 1970s, formalized by 1980 — the first hereditary succession in the communist world, prepared by the son's own construction of the father's cult and doctrine, the systematizer building the founder's monument and his own inheritance in the same work); and the end (the death of July 8, 1994, in the midst of the first nuclear crisis and on the eve of the first inter-Korean summit — the state plunged into the famine years without him, the mourning (genuine, staged, and both, in the witnesses' divided accounts) filling the squares; the constitution amended to make him the state's Eternal President — the office retired with its holder, the only head of state in the modern world who remains, in law, his country's president after death). The early community he left was the doctrine's whole apparatus: the party, the army, the schools, the study system, and a population formed from birth inside the doctrine's categories — the community the growth lesson follows into the second and third generations.
The founder's last word is his office: since 1998, the constitution of the state he founded has named him its Eternal President, and the presidency itself has stood vacant in his honor — a constitutional arrangement without parallel in the modern world, in which the highest office of a state is held, permanently, by its dead founder, and his successors rule by other titles (the party's chairmanship, the army's supreme command, the state affairs commission) in his name. The comparativists reach, for once, for the building's own vocabulary without embarrassment: a founder who remains his country's sovereign after death, whose mausoleum is its holiest place and whose birthday is its greatest festival, occupies in his state's life the position the older rooms reserve for the ascended and the enthroned in heaven. The school records the parallel as the comparativists state it, and leaves the theology — as it leaves the doctrine's — to the student's own conclusions.
Lesson 3: Growth, change, and reform
The history semester's third lesson is the doctrine's career after its systematization: the decades in which Juche governed a state's whole life, met its crises, and was amended by its heirs. The consolidation first (1967–1994): the monolithic system's completion (the Ten Principles of 1974 as the doctrine's rule of life; the constitution of 1972 installing Juche as the state's creative application of Marxism-Leninism — the formula by which the doctrine still deferred, in form, to the older canon; the cult's full flowering (the Tower of the Juche Idea raised in 1982 for the founder's seventieth birthday, the treatise of the same year as the system's philosophical capstone); the economy's turn (the 1970s' opening to Western and Japanese credit for turnkey plants — the debt default that followed being the state's first great economic failure, papered over in the doctrine's accounts and plain in the creditors'; the South's economy passing the North's in the same decade, the legitimacy contest's material verdict reversing — the doctrine answering with the “Korean-style socialism” campaigns and the speed battles, the Chollima's heirs); and the succession's construction (the son's authorship of the doctrine's systematization being itself the succession's mechanism: Kim Jong Il, through the party's ideology apparatus, defined the father's thought as an eternal system and himself as its authorized interpreter — the growth's most consequential institutional fact, and the model the third generation would inherit).
The crisis decades are the lesson's second half: the patron's collapse (1989–91 — the socialist market's dissolution removing the economy's fuel, fertilizer, and trade at a stroke; the founder's death in 1994 in the midst of it); the famine (the Arduous March of the state's account — the floods of 1995–96 on an already failing agriculture, the public distribution system's breakdown, the deaths the demographers estimate between several hundred thousand and over a million, the population's survival substantially by the markets (jangmadang) that sprang up illegally and were tolerated of necessity: the doctrine's self-reliant economy replaced, at the base, by the people's own unplanned trading — the growth's deepest irony and its most documented fact, the markets persisting into the present as the economy's real retail system under a doctrine that does not admit them); the amendments (Songun — the military-first line of the famine years, rationalized as the doctrine's development: the army as the revolution's main force and the society's model, the nuclear program as its shield; the byungjin line of 2013 (the parallel development of the nuclear deterrent and the economy) and its declared completion in 2018; the 2024 turn on reunification); and the reforms that are not called reforms (the market tolerance, the special economic zones' fitful history, the mobile phones' millions under a state monopoly — the system adapting beneath its doctrine's unchanging text, as systems do: the change real, the reform unavowed, the doctrine's elasticity being, the historians note, the same quality its texts call creativity). The era's assessment closes the lesson: Juche has now governed for longer than Marxism-Leninism governed the Soviet Union; it has survived its founder, its famine, and its patron; and its amendments have all been made in its founder's name by his descendants — a career the student should compare, without hurry, with the building's other long-lived systems: the doctrine that cannot be reformed in name is reformed in fact, and the name's continuity is itself the reform's instrument. The modern world follows: the doctrine in the present decade.
The growth lesson's last word is a number that is also an argument: when the founder died in 1994, the outside world's consensus — in the press, the academies, and the intelligence services of the interested powers — gave his state a few years at most; the famine, the succession, and the patron's loss would finish it. The state is now in its fourth decade past that obituary, under the founder's grandson, with its doctrine intact in form and its economy transformed in fact. The school's student should file the failed obituary beside the doctrine's own failed prophecies (the reunification by dates certain, the economy's overtaking of the South) as the history semester's paired lesson in humility: this room has out-predicted its undertakers and under-performed its scriptures, in about the proportions the building's older rooms will recognize from their own annals. The modern world, where both errors are still being made daily, follows.
Lesson 4: Juche in the modern world
The history semester closes with the doctrine's present: the third generation's North Korea, in which Juche remains the state's official creed while the state's actual life has moved — the lesson's task being to hold both facts at once, as the record requires. The present dispensation: Kim Jong Un (in office since December 2011) rules a state whose ideology is now officially styled Kimilsungism-Kimjongilism — the two dead leaders' combined thought as the eternal guide — with Juche as its core; whose economy runs, in practice, on the tolerated markets and a growing moneyed class (the donju, the money masters of the market era) beneath a socialist constitution; whose nuclear and missile programs — the deterrent declared complete in its first phase in 2017–18, the arsenal expanding since — are presented by the state as self-reliance's guarantee and treated by its neighbors and the UN Security Council as the region's central security problem (the sanctions regime in force since 2006, tightened through 2017); and whose information wall, the doctrine's practical foundation, is increasingly porous (the smuggled media, the Chinese-border phones, the defectors' accounts flowing back — the outside world's picture of the North substantially built, in the present century, from the testimony of the more than thirty thousand who have reached the South, a source the state denounces and the historians use with the cautions due any single archive).
The modern arguments about the doctrine are the lesson's second half, kept in their columns as this room requires: the state's account (a sovereign nation, encircled and sanctioned, keeping its independence and its social order by its own strength; a people united around its leadership in the doctrine's bonds; the achievements paraded — the rebuilt Pyongyang, the nuclear deterrent, the space program's satellites — as self-reliance's fruits); the outside scholars' divided readings (the “religion” reading — Juche as a political religion with its own sacred texts, holy sites, and eternal sovereign, the reading this building's placement of the room implicitly adopts for study purposes; the “façade” reading — the doctrine as a legitimating vocabulary for a hereditary security state, its content whatever the leadership requires, the 2024 reunification reversal cited as the vocabulary's elasticity in action; and the “lived” reading — the ethnographers' caution that the doctrine's meaning to its population is neither the state's claim nor the critics' dismissal, but something the record cannot reach: the private accommodations, ironies, and genuine pieties of twenty-six million people, documented only in fragments — the school's own position being the third reading's humility about the first two's completeness); and the doctrine's future as the record leaves it (the succession unarranged in public for a fourth generation; the economy's market facts pressing on the doctrine's texts; the state's survival, now into its eighth decade, standing as the doctrine's strongest practical argument and its people's endurance as its largest unanswerable question). The semester's verdict: Juche is the building's only room that is also a state, and its history is therefore the record of what a doctrine does when it is given a country — and what a country does to a doctrine. The texts follow: the canon in which the doctrine argues itself, read whole.
The modern lesson's final exhibit is a border: the river at Dandong, the bridge to Sinuiju, the trucks crossing in the night satellite photographs that are the outside world's favorite portrait of the doctrine's present — a lit coast to the south and east, a dark interior, the bridge a line of lights between two economies and two centuries. The school's student should resist the photograph's rhetoric in both directions: the dark is not empty (it contains the markets, the phones, the private plots, and twenty-six million interior lives), and the lights are not the whole of the south's account either. The year's whole method is in the resistance: the doctrine in its texts, the state in its acts, the people in their silence — and the student, at the border of what can be known, learning to say exactly where his knowledge stops. The texts follow, in which the doctrine speaks for itself at full length, as it prefers to be heard.